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This thesis develops a quantitative technique tc
assist policy makers faced with difficult arms
transfer questions. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory,
augmented by the Constant Sum Method, offers greater
potential for measuring military capabilities than
current methods. An examination of Third World naval
capabilities proves the combined technique workable
and capable of incorporating expert judgments into a
meaningful policy-making tool.
The thesis demonstrates that current techniques
understate the potential threat from Third World
navies. Naval capabilities are found to be
concentrated in areas vital to Western interests. The
analysis emphasizes the importance of technology and
human/societal factors in the development of these
capabilities. The major conclusion is that increased
study into implications of rapidly expanding Third
World naval capabilities is required due to the direct
potential threat to Western interests.
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"The qualitative transformations which have taken
place in naval forces have also changed the approach to
evaluating the relative might of navies and their combat
groupings: we have had to cease comparing the number of
warships of one type or another and their total dis-
placement (or the number of guns in a salvo or the
weight of this salvo) , and turn to a more complex, but
also more correct appraisal of the striking and
defensive power of snips, based on a mathematical
analysis or their capaoilities and qualitative
characteristics. M
Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy
"Navies in War and Peace"
(Morshkoy Sbornik, No. 2, 1972)
Transfers of sophisticated weapons systems to Third
World nations have generated increasing concern within the
United States in recent years. One need only follow the
public defcates over proposed sales of various weapons to
note the level of interest. For example, within the past
year there have been heated discussions centering around the
proposed transfer of PERSHING surface-to-surface missiles to
Israel, the sale of advanced fighters (F-14, F-15, F-16) to
Iran and Israel, the intent to deliver HAWK surface-to-




Interest in the growth of Third World naval capabilities
has tended to lag behind anxiety created by transfers of
air- and ground-related systems. However, world attention
was directed to lesser developed nations* naval capabilities
by several dramatic events which occurred during the
1967-1973 timeframe. Antiship missiles destroyed the OSS
Liberty and the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" in 1967. A
Pakistani EAPHNE SS sank the Indian destroyer "Khurkri" in
1970. The Israelis utilized GABRIEL surface-to-surface
missiles (SSMs) and SAAH PTFGs to decimate Egyptian and
Syrian missile boat forces in October 1973.
These attacks brought the naval threat to public notice.
The implications for military planners and Western
policymakers became clear—Third World antiship missile
combatants and torpedo-firing submarines present a threat to
ships of maritime powers. Since the threat is credible,
Third World recipients of these systems have the ability to
influence the actions of world powers and to utilize naval
forces as foreign policy tools. Further, Third World
nations, acting singly or in concert, have the means to deny
limited ocean areas to Western navies. Some of these ocean
areas, such as the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca,
are vital to Western military and economic interests.
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The following crisis scenario emphasizes the nature and
extent of this threat. It is set in the approximate
political circumstances of 1977 to present a plausible
framework for focusing attention on the naval capabilities
of the participants. The naval inventories upon which the
scenario is based are real. The concerns of analysts tasked
with evaluating Third World naval forces are also genuine.
A. SCENABIO
On 25 March 1980 Iraq invaded Kuwait. Irag justified
the invasion on the grounds of long-standing claims to
border areas between the two nations. Western observers
view the attack as an attempt to capture Kuwaiti oil
reserves in light of the rapid depletion of Iraqi petroleum
supplies. Kuwait's Western-equipped army blunted the
initial thrust, but the smaller Kuwaiti force will be
defeated without massive resupply from the West and/or
outside military assistance.
Fears that an Iraqi victory might presage a similar
attack on Saudi oil-producing areas prompted Saudi Arabia to
order its military forces into Kuwait on 27 March. Both
13

countries immediately called on the United States for
military resupply. As of 31 March, the United States has
not responded. Aerial resupply of Kuwait is infeasible.
The United States is hesitant to commit merchant ships
and/or its snail Indian Ocean naval force to the restricted
waters of the Persian Gulf given the existing antiship
missile threat. Alternative options, such as a naval
resupply through Saudi Red Sea ports, probably would not
permit delivery of urgently needed military equipment in
time to prevent Kuwait's defeat.
The Saudi decision to assist Kuwait raised concern in
Iraq that the modern Saudi Navy might be able to secure the
Persian Gulf sea lanes and allow supplies to reach Kuwait by
sea in time to affect the military outcome. Thus, on
28 March Iraq requested naval support from Iran. The
Iranian Navy is recognized as the dominant naval force in
the Persian Gulf. The Shan of Iran demanded that Iraq
relinquish all claims to offshore oil-producing areas in
dispute between the two nations in return for his support.
Two days later Iraq accepted his condition and the Shah
instituted a naval blockade of the Persian Gulf. Little oil
has flowed from the Gulf since hostilities began on the
25th. Western shipowners felt that the risk of attack by
14

Iraqi OSA PTfGs was too high to allow tankers to enter the
Gulf. With the institution of the Iranian blackade all oil
shipments frcm the area ceased. As a result, severe
petroleum shortages are anticipated in Western Europe and
Japan.
Libyan President Qadhaafi saw the crisis as an
opportunity to strike back at his moderate Arab foes. On
28 March he declared a "combat zone" extending 50 miles off
the Egyptian coast and threatened t.o sink any shipping
operating within this area. The action effectively blocked
the Suez Canal and halted Saudi oil shipments to Europe from
pipeline terminals on the Egyptian coast. The Libyan
decision carried the tacit approval of the Soviet Onion,
Libya's major arms supplier.
On the following day a British tanker and a Japanese
merchant ship were sunk by submarines off Alexandria, Egypt.
Later that same day, a U.S. merchant ship was attacked by an
unidentified submarine cff the Israeli coast. The
submarines involved are believed to be FOXTHOT SSs delivered
to Libya by the Soviet Union between 1977 and 1979.
However, some analysts suggest that the attacks could have
been conducted by Soviet FOXTROTS which typically operate in
15

the Mediterranean. These observers emphasize the minimal
risk attached to such action because of the inability to
differentiate between a submerged Libyan FOXTROT and a
Soviet submarine of the same class. At the same time, the
Soviets cculd derive substantial gains from an emphatic show
of support for their radical Arab clients.
On 29 March Egypt called upon Western naval powers to
assist in breaking the Libyan blockade. No decision has
been announced to date. The United States is reluctant to
commit less than a major air and sea effort to the task
given the 30-40 Libyan missile boats and unknown number of
submarines believed to be operating in the area. On the
afternoon of the 29th the Sixth Fleet was ordered to stand
clear of the "combat zone" pending a decision on the
Egyptian request. This action, coupled with public
statements ccncerning the possibility of a superpower
confrontation, support the hypothesis that Soviet submarines
may be operating within the "combat zone" in concert with
Libyan forces. Several NATO ministerial meetings have been
held since the blockade was instituted. The other NATO
members are known to be pressuring the United States tc
break the blockade in view of the developing economic
repercussions of the oil cutback.
16

Israel labeled the attack on the U. S. merchant ship
bound for Haifa an act of war and ordered its navy to
prosecute all submarine contacts within 50 miles of the
Israeli coast. On 30 March a SAAfi PTFG detected and
attacked a submarine outside the Haifa harbor. The Soviets
claim that Israel attacked a Soviet submarine operating in
international waters. Western sources are unable to
substantiate the allegation. The USSR admonished the U.S.
to "...impress upon the client state of Israel the full
impact of its irresponsible action," and warned that
"...future unprovoked attacks will elicit appropriate
responses. .. with attendant threats to world peace."
As of 31. March, the Israeli order to actively prosecute
all submarine contacts remains in effect. The Soviet Union
is rapidly augmenting its Mediterranean force. The Libyan
blockade remains in effect, as do the Iranian naval patrols,
The ground war continues in Kuwait. The economic crisis in
Japan and Western Europe is worsening and the United States
is faced with the prospect of a superpower confrontation in
the eastern Mediterranean.
B. SCENA5I0'S IMPACT ON THE WEST
17

The scenario projects a crisis in 1980 based primarily
on the ability of lesser developed nations to deny portions
of the worlds oceans to Western ships. Concern over this
type of scenario already exists and will probably expand as
nations situated in vital geographic areas increase their
naval capabilities. Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil
production is a reality in 1977 and will probably remain of
crucial importance in the 1980 period.
The forces central to the scenario are representative of
the rapid build-up of sophisticated naval weapons systems in
various geographic regions during the 1970' s. The naval
forces of the seven nations discussed in the scenario are
either on hand in 1977, or are projected to be in place
prior to 1980. The naval inventories of the participants
are outlined briefly to illustrate the scope of the
build-up. l
1. Iraq has acquired ten OSA PTFGs from the Soviet
Union since 1973. further deliveries are probable.
2. Kuwait is aware of the possible threat to its
coastline and to its increasing tanker tonnage. 2 Surface-
18

to-surface missile boats are expected to be added to its
inventory in the near future. 3
3. Saudi Arabia has contracted for a major naval
expansion program with the U.S. At least some of the ships
will be missile-equipped and will be stationed at facilities
to be constructed in the Persian Gulf.*
4. Iran possesses seven surface-to-surface missile-
equipped combatants and has 16 additional units on order
from various Western sources. The Shah has contracted for
three U.S. diesel submarines. These units will serve as
training vehicles for an expanded submarine force. 5 The
Iranian Navy has support ships, surveillance aircraft,
helicopters and hovercraft (some of which will mount SSMs)
which would be useful in a Persian Gulf blockade.
5. Libya owns three missile-equipped combatants and has
42 additional units on order from the USSR and Western
sources. Libya has also concluded an agreement with the
Soviet Union for up to six FOXTROT SSs. The first of these
diesel submarines was delivered in January 1977.
*
6. Egyptian naval inventories include 12 diesel
19

submarines and 16 missile-equipped combatants. Sgypt has
begun construction of ships equivalent to the Soviet KCMAB
PIG. Negotiations are underway with British firms for the
revitalizaticn of other existing Soviet-supplied missile
combatants.
7. The mainstay of the Israeli Navy is its 18 SAAB
PTFGs, some cf which carry sonars. Six additional units are
scheduled to be built in Israel. The Israeli Navy possesses
two diesel submarines and three additional units have been
ordered from the U.K.
The next chapter is devoted to an examination of Western
concerns, the build-up of sophisticated naval combatants in
the Third World, and the factors promoting the increase in
the naval inventories of lesser developed nations. Chapter
III will discuss the limitations of current approaches to
quantifying naval arms transfers and will suggest an
alternative method (Multi-Attribute Utility Theory) which
offers to overcome some of the deficiencies in evaluating
naval weapons capabilities.
The following chapters attempt to apply Multi- Attribute
Utility Theory (M.A0T) to the arms transfer situation with
20

respect tc deliveries of antiship missile combatants and
torpedo- firirg diesel submarines to Third World nations.
Chapter IV details the questionnaire construction process
and discusses the procedure used in selecting questionnaire
respondents. Chapter V develops the utility curves which
form the basis for the technique and applies the curves to
specific weapons systems encountered in Third World
inventories. Chapter VI is concerned with procedures
involved in developing factor scores relating to Third World
nations* capabilities to maintain and operate these
sophisticated weapons systems. The final chapter presents
conclusions and recommendations for future research.
21

II. SCOPE OF THE THREAT
This chapter describes the threat embodied in the
acquisition cf antiship missile combatants and diesel
submarines by Third World nations. The first section
presents concerns as expressed by influential naval
spokesmen and highlights the vulnerabilities of crude oil
transportation to lesser developed nations' naval forces.
The second portion describes post-World War II trends in
acquisitions of surface-to-surface missile (SS1A) combatants
and modern diesel submarines. The final section of the
chapter identifies major factors which have contributed to'
the rapid increase in these weapon systems in Third World
inventories and those influences which are likely to affect
the trends in the foreseeable future.
A. INCREASEE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The development of lesser developed countries' navies is
the subject cf growing concern among Western naval planners.
22

In the past the ability of the United States Navy to provide
sea control has been discussed with respect to the
interdiction capabilities of the Soviet Navy. However, the
expanding inventories of modern naval units in the Third
World inject new urgency into the counsel of influential
spokesmen whc warn that "...the age-old lessons of seapower
must be put forward. Those who have the capacity to use
these sea routes in safety will survive. Those who have the
capacity to interrupt this international intercourse will
remain, as always in the past, in a position to achieve
their ends. 117
This somber warning is linked to a growing awareness
that in addition to the Soviet threat to sea lanes, "Other
coastal nations can temporarily threaten U.S. forces acting
in support of the national strategy." 8 Or, as stated in the
Forward to Jane 1 s Fighting Ships 1 975 -76:
"...A small power possessed of fast attack craft
with missiles now occupies a position where it can deny
sea areas to the ships of far larger na vies. . .Difficult
targets themselves, these craft are possessed of a power
of destruction hitnerto unbelievable. No major naval
power can believe itself invulnerable in the face of
such a threat." 9
The authors succinctly define the apparent paradox in the
Persian Gulf scenario, namely the ability cf numerically
23

small naval forces to close vital ocean areas to ships of
major naval powers.
"...So we find a strange imbalance amongst the
world's navies. The major nations may consider their
power, their ability to deploy considerable forces to
areas where they wish to exert pressure, as pre-eminent,
but the number of localities where such a move could be
unopposed is decreasing. The comparative cheapness and
simplicity of the counter is making it available to many
countries hitherto considered an non-starters in any
naval race." 10
Beyond the direct threat to fighting ships, there is an
acute awareness of the threat to Western economic interests
embodied in the naval expansion of Third World nations. The
former Secretary of the Navy, J. William Middendorf II,
identified the degree of U.S. dependence on the seas when he
noted, "It is estimated that more than 70 percent of U.S.
trade is with nations other than the two contiguous states
of Canada and Mexico. And more than 99 percent of our raw
materials and overseas foreign trade moves by sea." 11
The problems facing the West are more precisely defined
by Geoffrey Kemp.
"During the 1970's changes in the inter-national
system are taking place which suggest that we would fce
well advised to regain our "geographical sense" and
appreciate seme of the very real constraints which
geography new imposes. .. The Western industrial countries
are becoming increasingly dependent upon the
transhipment of scarce raw materials ... located in, and
moving through, volatile conflict areas... Of special





Within this area, control of strategic choice
points. .. must be assigned greater priority in our
strategic thinking." 12
In discussing "the new strategic map" Kemp calls for a
southern hemisphere strategy and draws attention to four
countries— Erazil, Iran, India, and South Africa. All of
these nations are involved in expanding their missile
combatant and/or diesel submarine inventories.
Watertorne movement of crude oil accounts for a major
portion of the ocean commerce of the U.S. and its allies.
The difficult task of protecting this traffic has been
compounded by recent developments alluded to in the Persian
Gulf scenario. These factors combine to greatly increase
oil tanker vulnerability.
1. There has been a trend toward increasing the size of
crude oil carriers. This in turn severely restricts the
routes these ships can use. The restrictions create an
inflexible system dependent upon narrowly defined sea lanes
and increase oil transportation vulnerability to
interdiction and disruption. The inflexibility makes the
tankers easy targets to find and negates any need for
sophisticated locating systems. Thus, the ships are
25

vulnerable to guerrilla attacks by naval units of relatively
unsophisticated navies.
2. The sea lanes transit straits where interdiction of
tanker traffic is relatively easy. Figure 1 depicts major
sea lanes and identifies choke points through which they
pass. The fact that traffic is heavily concentrated in
restricted areas, such as the Straits of Hormuz and the
Straits of Malacca, raises the credibility of a threat to
attack oil tankers and increases the value of interdiction
platforms owned by nations located in the vicinity of the
chcke points.
3. The extreme cost of modern supertankers makes a
credible threat to these ships sufficient to disrupt
shipping patterns. Private owners of these vessels are not
likely to risk their tremendous investments in the face of
threats such as the one outlined in the opening scenario.
4. The supertankers have become inviting targets for
nations uith small naval inventories. The increased size of
an average tanker raises the possibility that one well-aimed
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effect than the anti-convoy operations of World War II. 13
This raises the cost effectiveness of a small submarine
force operating in an interdiction role. It is not
suggested that a lesser developed nation would be able to
completely interdict a major sea lane with the submarine
inventories currently on hand. However, sinking even one
supertanker would have a tremendous impact on the entire oil
transportation system and the' Western world in general.
Some analysts give navies of lesser developed nations the
capacity to interdict vital lifelines and acknowledge that
diesel submarines "...could because of random dispersal...




The Persian Gulf is the central geographic area in terms
of crude cil production and transportation. Countries
surrounding the Gulf accounted for 38.5 percent of world oil
reserves in 1974. is If Saudi reserves are added, the region
accounted fcr 58.1 percent of the known oil deposits.
Persian Gulf nations produced 23.3 percent of the crude oil
extracted in the same year. When Saudi production is added,
the area accounted for 38.4 percent of world production.
With the inclusion of vast natural gas deposits found in





















































becomes even more pronounced.
The effect that closing the Straits of Hormuz to tanker
traffic wculd have on the economies of Europe and Japan is
graphically displayed in Figure 2. Reports based on 1976
consumption indicate that the Straits of Hormuz offer a
potential interdiction point for 90 percent of Japan's oil,
75 percent cf Europe's oil, 70 percent of Australia's cil
and 30 percent of U.S. oil imports. 16 Movement of this vast
quantity cf cil requires that a tanker transit the Straits
every eight minutes, 24 hours a day, every day of the
year. l 7
The vulnerability of this tremendous oil flow to
interdiction is acknowledged. The level of concern is
evidenced by the following excerpt from testimony given by
the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt, Jr., to the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs in January 1973.
"...The route is a very long one, some 12,000 miles
from Kuwait to New York and most of it passes through
areas where U.S. forces have little operating experience
and few bases. Mustering the military means to protect
this long icute would strain our resources severely.
"...The oil exported from the Gulf must pass through
the Strait cf Hormuz. The Gulf itself is quite shallow
and the Straits are generally narrow. This, plus the
deep drafts of the supertankers, means maneuvering rcom
for large tankers is quite restricted. .. Sinking just a
handful cf tankers in critical passages could
effectively block shipments from the Gulf for a long
time... there is little the U.S. could now do militarily




"Another possibility is that the tanker shipments
might fc€ attacked in the open ocean after they left the
Gulf.... To bring any... naval capabilities to bear in the
Persian Gulf area could require as much as a month. Our
Mideast Force, normally comprising just two or threedestroyers, would require augmentation to have
significant combat capability." 18
B. INVENTORY INCREASES
The major capabilities of the navies of lesser developed
nations are embodied in surface-to-surface missile- equipped
surface combatants. 19 Various authors have noted that
"...the proliferations of the comparatively small fast
patrol craft armed with missiles must inevitably change the
balance cf power in many important areas." 20 Firepower
increases which accompany the acquisition of these units are
evident in the statement that "...the improvement in missile
capability new gives a single ship a capacity for
destruction only equalled in the past by great fleets and
squadrons of aircraft." 21 "Some observers have forecast
major changes in naval tactics and in the world balance of
naval power as a result of the proliferation of
missile-armed patrol boats." 22
These combatants have demonstrated tneir capabilities.
The 1967 Israeli missile attack on the USS Liberty and the
31

destruction cf the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" by Egyptian
S3-N-2/STSX missiles received much publicity. In the 1970
Indo-Pakistani War, Indian OSA PTFGs reportedly sank one
Pakistani destroyer and damaged a second with SS-N-2
missiles. 23 The 1973 October War saw the first encounters
between antiship missile-equipped combatants. Israeli
reports of naval victories over Syrian and Egyptian OSA
PTFGs and KCKAB PTGs received wide_ notoriety
.
2 * The result
has been increased Third World interest in the ef f acti veness
of the Israeli SAAR PTFG and the GABRIEL SSM in particular,
and in the acquisition of surface-to-surface missile
combatants ir general.
There are five basic types of antiship missile systems
being built cutside the Soviet Union (EXOCET—France,
OTCMAT— France/Italy, GABRIEL— Israel, SEA KILLER— Italy,
PENGUIN-^Norway) . All are available for export. The
Soviets produce a number of antiship missiles, but expert
only the SS-N-2/STYX. 2S The U.S. HARPOON SSM is nearing
operational status and reportedly will be exported. 26 In
addition, seme missiles have been converted for antiship use
(such as the French SS-12) or adapted to provide an antiship
mode (such as the U.S. STANDARD). Most of these systems
are small enough to be mounted on combatants currently
32

operated by lesser developed nations. In addition to
retrofitting the systems on small combatants, a number of
nations have ordered modern combatants designed specifically
to mount these missile systems.
The recent dramatic increase in the number of antiship
missile-equipped combatants in lesser developed nations'
inventories began in 1961 with the transfer of two Soviet
KCMAfi PTGs to Indonesia. 27 3y 1976, 342 surface-to-surface
missile-equipped combatants had been delivered to lesser
developed 'nations. Fifteen units were deleted from various
nations* inventories, primarily through combat losses,
leaving the active Third World inventory at 327 units at the
end of 1976. The upward trend in deliveries and inventories
is displayed in Figure 3.
By 1980 at least 217 more antiship missile-equipped
surface combatants will be incorporated into Third World
inventories. This includes existing orders plus a
projection of current PRC production rates of 20 missile
units per year through 1980. The figure is understated to
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Figure 3 - MISSILE COMEATANT DELIVERY TREND
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delivered to Saudi Arabia under the Saudi Naval Expansion
Program is not available, and by the fact that additional
Soviet deliveries are almost certain to occur during the
period. Some missile units may be retired during the
1977-80 time period. Likely candidates for deletion would
be older KCMAB PTGs in the inventories of some countries.
Even if retirements do occur, deletions will not approach
the number of units being acquired during the same period.
Expanding deliveries have been accompanied by an
increase in the number of nations possessing missile
combatants. Ey the end of 1976, 30 countries owned this
type of weapons platform. Four additional nations
(Argentina, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) have
units on order and will join this group prior to the end of
the decade. The growth pattern is displayed in Figure 4.
The missile boat proliferation has been accompanied by
an enlargement of the ocean areas within range of missile
units. Figure 5 presents nations which possessed
surf ace-tc-surf ace missile combatants as of 1970. Nations
which currently have these units are depicted in Figure 6
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The second group of naval combatants with recognized sea
denial capabilities found in the Third World is diesel
submarines. The loss of the Indian destroyer "Khurkri" to a
Pakistani DAEHNE SS in December 1970 highlights the high
level of concern over the capability of lesser developed
nations to effectively deploy these units.
Submarine acquisition by Third World nations has shown a
less dramatic increase than missile combatant procurement.
Initial deliveries took place in the post-World War II
period. Ey the end of 1976, 206 submarines had been
delivered tc Third World navies. Unlike the missile
combatants, a substantial number of units have been retired,
so that the current Third World torpedo-firing diesel
submarine inventory consists of 158 units. An additional 65
submarines are on order for delivery prior to 1980.
Included in this figure are projections that the PRC will
continue its current production rate of six ROMEO SSs per
year and that the North Koreans will continue to produce two
units annually. As was the case with the missile
combatants, unannounced Soviet deliveries are possible.
Additional retirements are likely as BALAO SSs and
Soviet-supplied WHISKEYS reach the end of their usable
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lives. 28 Th€ diesel submarine acquisition trends are shown
in Figure 7. (Figure 7 is drawn to the same scale as Figure
3 to aid in osaking comparisons between missile combatant and
submarine acquisitions.) However, it must be noted that
submarine retirements have resulted in the acquisition of
replacements characterized by longer operating ranges,
greater submerged endurance, more complex electronics and
more sophisticated torpedo loads. 29 So, to some extent the
modernization process has resulted in replacing coastal
submarines with units having improved open ocean
capabilities and increased interdiction potential. 30
Seventeen nations currently possess diesel submarines
and four nations (Ecuador, Uruguay, Iran and Libya) are
scheduled tc receive torpedo- firing submarines prior tc
1S80. Figure 8 shows the relatively steady increase in
numbers of diesel submarine recipients. As was the case
with nations possessing antiship missile-equipped
combatants, a number of nations possessing diesel submarines
are located in the vicinity of oil lane choke points.
Figure 9 displays the geographical locations of the 17
nations which have diesel submarines in their inventories.










































































































THIfiD WORLD SEA DENIAL CAPABILITIES
Country Antiship Missile Torpedo-Firing Diesel
Combatants Submarines























Ivory Coast ~" X X
Senegal X X
Somalia X





















China (PRC) X X
Indonesia X '
Korea, North X






Source: Various (See Appendix A.)
44

combatants and torpedo-firing diesel submarines in Third
World naval inventories.
C. REASONS FCR GROWTH OF NAVAL CAPABILITIES
A number of factors have contributed to the growth of
torpedo-firing diesel submarines and surface-to-surface
missile-eguicped combatants in Third World inventories.
These factors are likely to remain operable for the near
future. Thus, it is anticipated that the threat to Western
economic and military assets will continue to expand.
The following factors are identified because of their
influence on Third World weapons procurement. No attempt is
made to present an exhaustive listing.
1. Proven operational capabilities in the hands of Third
World navies. Egypt and India have demonstrated the
effectiveness of a surface-to-surface missile fired at
non-missile combatants. Israel has shown the effectiveness
of the GAERIEI SSM against combatants mounting the Soviet
SS-N-2. This demonstrated capability has lead to a number
of arms sales. Prior to the 1973 war, Israel had only
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exported the GABRIEL to Singapore. 3i since 1973 the GA3EIEL
reportedly has been introduced in South Korea, 32 Thailand, 33
and Taiwan. 34 GABRIELS were ordered by Argentina in 1974. 3 s
In 1974 South Africa decided to purchase the GABRIEL and the
RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG, rather than purchase Portuguese and
French corvettes carrying the French EXOCET missile. 36
2. Requirement to replace aging World War II surface
ships and submarines. A number of Third World nations have
received World War II vintage ships and submarines from the
U.S. and West European sources. Rather than replacing these
aging systems with conventional destroyers and frigates,
these nations have generally chosen to acquire smaller,
missile-equipped combatants. Some nations, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and India, are replacing obsolete units
with ships cf comparable size carrying surface-to-surface
missiles. 37 The identical obsolescence problem is
confronting nations which possess aging submarines. These
nations have ordered modern submarines like the West German
TYPE 209 SS and TYPE 206/500 SS as replacements. The
resulting submarine fleets have longer ranges, improved
maintainability and a greater degree of sophistication.
3. Improved ab<jiility to pay. Economic considerations
46

are central to the overall arms transfer situation. They
are also applicable to the expansion of sophisticated naval
weapons systems in the Third World. Two examples f
demonstrate the financial commitment being made on the part
of some Third World nations. Iran is spending $338 Million
on each of four U.S. DD-963's it has ordered 38 and intends
to construct a $2 Billion naval base at Chah Bahar close to
the Pakistani border. 39 Saudi Arabia will expend in excess
of $1 Billion for ships, training and facilities associated
with the Saudi Naval Expansion Program now underway. 40 Most
of the naval arms transfers represent sales, rather than
grants or aid. Prices remain competitive because of active
marketing by suppliers. Missile systems in particular are
relatively inexpensive. 41 Most of these missile systems can
be mounted on a variety of combatants already in Third World
inventories tc further reduce system costs.
On the other hand, diesel submarine purchases represent
major outlays. For example, recent estimates place the cost
of West German-built TYPE 206/500 submarines at $15 to $21
Million each. 42 Also, there is less competition between
suppliers, since only France, West Germany and the U.K. are
producing new units for "export and only the U.S. and USSR
are involved in transfers of reconditioned units. Financial
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considerations may largely account for the relatively small
number of lesser developed submarine recipients.
4. Existence of offshore disputed areas. Resources
located in offshore areas are increasing in value and are
becoming more exploitable as a result of technological
advances. For example, offshore oil deposits account for
approximately 20 percent of world reserves. New drilling
technologies allowing exploitation at greater depths are
expected to raise this percentage significantly. 43 Oil-
rich areas under dispute between nations with surface-to-
surface missile combatants and/or diesel submarines include:
the Spratley and Paracel Island areas (PRC, Vietnam,
Taiwan) , the Persian Gulf (Iran and Iraq) and the Aegean Sea
(Greece and Turkey). 44 These disputes generate requirements
for naval forces capable of protecting national claims to
the resources. Additional reguirements are probable as
exploitation and exploration techniques identify additional
resource-rich ocean areas.
5. Extension of national economic zones. Proposals to
extend national economic zones out to 200 miles have been
introduced at the Law of the Sea Conference. Failure of the
Conference to act upon these proposals has led to a series
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of unilateral declarations of 200-mile economic zones.
Expanded economic zones would provide impetus for enlarging
naval forces and extending naval operating ranges to permit
patrols out to the 200-mile limit. Present Law of the Sea
proposals will probably promote a trend established by early
proponents of enlarged territorial waters. In 1970
Argentina and Chile were early advocates of 200 mile fishing
zones. 45 Both have since acquired and/or ordered
sophisticated submarines and missile combatants with
extended ranges. Seven nations (Argentina/ Brazil, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay) were early supporters
of vastly increased territorial waters. Of this group,
three (Argentina, Brazil and Peru) have received and/or
ordered destroyer-size missile ships with extended ranges.
Five (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) have
ordered and/or taken delivery of sophisticated submarines
(TYPE 209 and OBERON SSs) since that time. This preliminary
data suggests a correlation between support for extended
economic zones and a perceived need to upgrade the firepower
and operating ranges of naval forces. Further expansion of
the size, range and sophistication of Third World naval
combatants and a proliferation in the number of recipients
could follow the move toward the 200 mile norm.
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III. QUANTIFYING SEA DENIAL CAPABILITY,
This chapter examines various methods for quantifying
military worth of weapons systems in an attempt to describe
the capabilities and limitations of each approach. The
first portion of the chapter examines the numerical/
inventory approach used in Chapter II. The second section
outlines seme alternative methods for dealing with the
subject of capabilities analysis and describes one recent
approach to the problem of developing capabilities scores.
The final portion of the chapter discusses Multi-Attribute
Utility Theory and potential usage of this approach in
military capability measurement.
A. NUME2ICAI/INVENT0RY APPROACH
The numerical/inventory approach to quantifying arms
transfer issues is one of the more popular methods currently
in use. It effers many of the advantages of quantification
discussed in connection with measurement in the policy
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sciences.* 6 The technique is useful in discussions of tae
type presented in Chapter II where the purpose is to provide
background information and to alert the reader to a threat.
Since the unit of measurement is the weapon system itself,
the approach can provide an accurate accounting for the
volume and direction of arms traffic.
The method is often over-used and incorrectly applied.
It is incapable of describing qualitative differences
between varicus platforms within a class of weapon systems,
since the unit of measure (in the present case either
missile combatants or diasel submarines) does not embody any
general attribute or characteristic upon which to base
comparisons. 47 So, for example, under the inventory
approach, a KCMAR PTG and an OSA PTFG would each count as
one missile ship regardless of the fact that the OSA carries
twice as many missiles as the K021AR. There is a qualitative
characteristic (firepower) which clearly differentiates the
KCMAB from the OSA. However, the numerical approach cannot
distinguish between the systems. Since the method cannot
make this type of distinction, it is not an appropriate
measure of military balance or military capability.
This limitation would appear to be obvious. Still, The
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Militarx Balance series published by the International
Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) advertises itself as,
"...a quantitative evaluation of military power " even
though it is based entirely upon a tabulation of force
levels. 43 Also, U.S. Government spokesmen regularly offer
inventory figures as a basis for arms transfer decisions in
situations where considerations of military balances are of
prime concern. For example, during the mid-1976
Congressional hearings concerning Saudi Arabia's request for
SIDEWINDSfi air-to-air missiles, the U.S. Arms Control Agency
endorsed the proposed sale of 1500 SIDEWINDEBs with the
statement that, "...the risk of conflict between Saudi
Arabia and neighboring states is unlikely to be affected by
this number of missiles."* 9 No mention was made of Saudi
military requirements, nor was there a discussion of any
increase in ailitary capabilities which might accompany the
transfer cf 1500 missiles. Moreover, decision makers appear
to make policy choices based on numerical approach-generated
figures. In the SIDEWINDER case, Congress permitted the
sale of 1500 precision-guided missiles to Saudi Arabia.
"Under a compromise agreement worked out with key Senators,
the State Department and the Pentagon, the proposed sale was




The demonstrated attachment to inventory counting may
derive frcm the fact that it is relatively simple,
unambiguous and easily accomplished by staff personnel.
There is little doubt that the information compiled in this
manner is misused. If the policy maker has a background
permitting him to comprehend the subtleties of the systems
involved, inventory figures might be correctly applied.
However, there are few decision makers with this analytic
knowledge.
There is a clear need for a measure of military worth
which can be constructed by analysts and operators who
possess an intimate acquaintance with the weapons being
evaluated. The technique must be both reliable 51 and
valid. 52 It must also offer meaningful information to the
policy maker faced with the difficult issues attached to
arms transfer decisions and considerations of military
balance and regional stability. These stringent conditions
are not easily met.
3. ALTERNATIVES TO NUMERICAL/INVENTORY QUANTIFICATION
The hazards involved in applying the numerical/ in ventory
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approach to capability measurement have produced attempts to
develop alternative quantification techniques. One method
seeks to measure military capability by addressing the
dominant system characteristic in order to avoid "...simple
number calculations (which) necessarily overlook relative
qualitative weapons system features.
"
5 3 Eldridge constructs
an index to measure Third World sea denial capabilities by
multiplying the number of platforms of a particular type
times the number of missile launchers/torpedo tubes carried
by that platform. 54 He aggregates these scores to determine
the sea denial capabilities of a Third World navy's missile
boat/diesel submarine forces.
Although the technique overcomes the major deficiency in
the inventory approach by addressing a qualitative
difference (firepower) , it fails to describe the wide
variety of factors which bear on successful accomplishment
of an anti-shipping mission. For example, the Eldridge
method would scale a BRAVE PTGL which carries eight SS-12
wire-guided missiles above a LA COMBAITANTE II PTFG mounting
four EXOCEI SSMs. The fact that the SS-12 has a range of
3.5 Nil and that the EXOCET has a 22 NM range would never be
considered. 55 All other missile characteristics which might
similarly bear on mission success are ignored in the same
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way. The approach completely ignores ship^ characteristics
which may make a major contribution to performing a given
mission.
Other students of arms transfer issues have attempted to
avoid inventory-related approaches by utilizing a dollar-
value measure. (Both the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute "SIPRI" and the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency "ACDA" rely on this approach). The
method is based on cost, "...the basic assumption being that
an increase in cost (in real terms) buys an increase in
performance or capability. ,,S6 This approach is intuitively
appealing, but it has major flaws deriving from difficulties
in using monetary value as a precise indicator of
gualitative differences. Valuation problems, uncertainties
in pricing foreign arms transfers (especially those from
communist nations) , difficulties in dealing with grants
and/or special financing arrangements and problems in
pricing arms transferred out of surplus stocks all
contribute to the difficulties with the method.
Inherent difficulties with the popular quantitative
techniques discussed to this point prompted LT Alan LeGrow
to examine alternative approaches to measuring military
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worth. In his thesis, Measuring Aircraft Capability for
Military and Political Analy sis, 57 LeGrow discusses possible
methods fcr quantifying capability and presents four scaling
techniques— factor analysis, paired comparisons, successive
intervals and multi-attribute utility scaling. He examines
the theoretical basis for each and identifies individual
strengths and weaknesses. He then scales aerial combat
capability of fighter aircraft using each method in turn.
LeGrow concluded that factor analysis could be a valuable
tool for military capabilities analysis allowing
incorporation of computer processing into a research effort.
However, he noted that much faith has been placed in this
approach due to its applications in data analysis, without
the requisite attention being paid to the difficult
implimentaticn tasks which must accompany its use in
capabilities analysis. He found that judgmental scaling
techniques offer viable alternatives to the more structured
factor analytic approach. The successive intervals method
demonstrated greater sensitivity to the responses of expert
judges than paired comparisons. However, the successive
intervals method suffers from an inability to measure system
capabilities where one system is generally agreed to be
either superior or inferior to another given system. The
problems with these scaling techniques led LeGrow to
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examine, and suggest farther analysis of, the capabilities
of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory as an analytic tool.
A recent discussion of arms racing in the Middle East
highlights many of the difficulties involved in guantifying
military capabilities which have been discussed in this
chapter. 58 The author of the article attempts to develop
"...a comprehensive set of inventory, capability and
manpower data" 59 in order to construct military capability
indices for Middle Eastern countries. Rattinger rejects the
capability indices which are based upon factor scores 60 in
favor of scores for major air, ground and naval systems
based on "...the simple product of speed, payload, and
comtat radius." 61 The author has difficulty applying
"payload" to ships, so "...all ships are therefore rank
ordered on a scale of 1 (for lowest) to 8 according xo main
armament, and the rank of each ship was treated as its
payload score." 62 Capability scores were then multiplied by
inventories and aggregated into national military capability
scores which form the basis for Rattinger' s study.
This December 1976 article is emphasized here for a
number of reasons. First, it demonstrates the growing
realization that measures of weapon system capabilities and
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accurate inventory figures are both necessary to meaningful
study of military balances. Second, the article is
indicative of the unsophisticated nature of military
capabilities measures currently being applied. Finally,
Eattinger invalidates his scale by elevating ordinal-level
data63 to interval-level 6 * and performs an operation
requiring ratio- level data 65 by multiplying interval-level
capability scores by inventory numbers. The failure tc
differentiate between interval and ratio-level data is a
continuing prcblem in arms transfer analysis. Many
researchers wish to measure country capabilities to make
comparisons between countries. This ultimately involves
multiplying system capability indexes by the numbers of
systems of the particular type contained in the nations*
inventories. Multiplication is not permitted with
interval-level data because of its arbitrary unit and
arbitrary origin characteristics. Clearly, an invalid score
based on simplistic criteria is not the answer to the
decision maker's complex problems.
C. MOLTI-ATTRIBOSE UTILITY APPROACH
It is often desirable to move from the side-by-side
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comparison of weapons capability permitted by interval-level
scaling techniques to a comparison of the military
capability of one country with another. An effort is
currently underway to develop a model to measure total
Soviet force effectiveness to improve "...the credibility of
long-range forecasting for defense intelligence estimates
and planning." 66 The Soviet Force Effectiveness Model
calculates theoretical weapon effectiveness (THE) measures
for over 200 weapons described in the Defense Intelligence
Projections for Planning (DIPP) . TWE takes into account
measures cf weapon lethality, accuracy and survivability
derived from a complex set of computer manipulations. The
TWE is then multiplied by force levels to generate
theoretical force effectiveness (TFE) measures. "In
addition to aggregating force levels and force
characteristics. .. the model permits the user to aggregate
the weapons by several missions." 67
The same types of calculations would aid in assessing
the sea denial potential of the nations depicted in the
opening scenario. For instance, it would be useful to
compare the naval capabilities of Libya and Egypt to better
evaluate Egypt's need for Western military support to break
the Libyan blockade. Also, at times it is useful to know
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the degree to which one weapon system's capabilities exceed
another's. Again referring to the scenario, how much better
is an Iranian LA COMBATTANTE II PTFG than a Saudi missile
combatant? In this light, what are the Saudi Navy's
capabilities to open Persian Gulf resupply lines?
These calculations require ratio-level measurement of
weapons' capabilities. While both the dollar-value and
inventory approaches provide ratio measures, they are
inapplicable for the reasons already discussed. The factor
analytic, paired comparison and successive interval methods
all provide interval-level measurement. Thus, there is a
definite need for multi-attribute utility's (MAUT) ability
to produce a ratio-level measure of weapons capabilities.
It does so by using utility curves which have a natural
origin as building blocks for developing system capability
scores.
A second important feature of MAUT is its ability to
base analysis on multi-faceted definitions of capability.
It offers to avoid simplifications required by the
numerical/inventory approach, the Eldridge method of
measuring firepower, aud Rattinger's measure based on
payload, speed and combat radius. MAUT permits analysis of
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a wide range cf factors which, when combined, would allow a
more sophisticated treatment of complex weapon systems'
military worth.
Before addressing MAUT in some detail, it is necessary
to carefully delineate where the present study should be
located on Bode's "Dialectical Hierarchy of Interactions.
"
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MAUT fits into the category which Bode terms "ex-ante""
assessments. 69 These ex-ante, or static, measures
"...assess starting conditions only, and relate to what
could happen, not what does happen in the real world..." 70
Bode notes that "...strong incentives remain for developing
static indices that are sufficiently general to serve as
rules of thumb for comparing forces," 71 and feels that such
indices are "...very useful supplements to the intuition of
the decision maker and analyst when structuring problems,
identifying alternatives for detailed consideration, and
checking obscure analysis." 72 MAUT is part of "...efforts
to develop Military Effectiveness Indices (MEI) that are
suitable for direct calculation of relative military
effectiveness without recourse to more complex war
gaming." 73 Thus, it seeks to evaluate operational and
engineering factors which determine weapon capabilities,
without explicitly considering an "enemy" and the two-sided
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combat situations required for dynamic modeling. As a
result, MAOT cannot, and does not seek to, predict outcomes
of engagenents between specific types of naval combatants
nor battle outcomes between various nations' naval forces.
1 . Theory
Otility or value theory is designed to facilitate
decision-making. It assumes that a decision maker will act
to maximize utility within his set of goals and constraints.
Otility theory requires that all possible decision outcomes
be quantified, that the utility of each be defined and that
the decision be based on maximizing utility. Otility
curves, which assign a real value to each possible outcome,
are central to the process.
Two important points must be emphasized with respect
to the derivation of these curves.
a. Ihe utility function depends on the subjective
judgment of the decision maker and on his perception of the
environment and the decision objectives.
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b. The utility function, once defined, acts as an
evaluative scale by which all possible outcomes can be
measured.
2. i££li£ation
Utility theory was developed and exhibited its
earliest applications in the social sciences. The
applicability of the theory is now being examined in a
broader range of decision-making contexts. BAND Corporation
has applied utility theory in an interactive computer
program to aid a tactical commander in maximizing the
utility of his forces in simulated strikes on Warsaw Pact
airbases. 74 Utility functions have also been considered in
the context cf the treaty negotiation process. 75 This
application seeks to develop utility curves to represent the
importance attached to each issue by each side and to define
a set of possible treaty outcomes which would allow a
mediator to guickly evaluate potential treaties and assist
in developing the treaty which is "best" for both sides.
A model for employing MAUT is suggested in the
process utilized by design engineers to optimize system
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design and maximize system worth. "While the purpose cf
the. . .analysis is finding an optimal system to fulfill an
objective, the solutions obtained can also be used to
evaluate or scale existing systems. In other words, the
optimal solution can be considered as an ideal model against
which all other systems can be judged." 76
The LeGrow thesis applies MAUT to fighter aircraft
and demonstrates a degree of subtlety which is impossible
with the ether techniques considered. For example, he uses
experts to develop utility scores for the MIG-21 and the
F-4E. The scores show the MIG-21 to be the superior fighter
platform. He then applies values from curves developed by
experts for pilot proficiency and country technological
capability. When combined with the platform utility scores,
the Israeli F-4E for example, demonstrates a higher utility
than an Egyptian MIG-21. None of the other techniques have
the ability to consider such a broad range of
characteristics, nor to consider personnel factors which are
crucial to system performance.
If the user accepts the assumptions needed for
ratio-level measurement, 77 utility scores for a nation's
inventory can be developed by multiplying numbers of
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platforms by their respective utility scores and summing.
Thus, for example, it would be possible to scale the utility v
of Saudi Arabia's and Iran's missile boat forces in a sea
denial scenario.
Arms transfer calculations are also possible with
MAUL For example, it would be useful for a decision maker
to be aware cf the utility of Saudi missile boats compared
to the utility of the Iraqi OSA PTFGs if he were faced with
a request frcm the Saudis for additional units. If the
policy maker desired parity between the forces'
capabilities, MAUT could identify the approximate number of
boats required by the Saudis to achieve a balance. The
theory could also suggest a rule-of-thumb for future arms
transfer decisions as Iraq receives additional units from
the USSR. Thus, MAUT calculations might provide a
meaningful determination of military balance.
The LeGrow examination of MAUT was done at the
theoretical level. He demonstrated the technique's
potential based on the inputs of two judges and suggested
further study of judgmental scaling in general, and of MAUT
in particular. The remainder of this thesis attempts to
apply MAUT to the missile boat/diesel submarine problem set
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forth in Chapters I and II. The goal is to expand and
evaluate this promising approach through practical




Ward Edwards, Marcia Guttentag and Kurt Snapper present
a concise study of the role of evaluative research in the
decision-making process in their article, "A Decisicn-
Theoretical Approach to Evaluation Research." 7Q The
authors assume that a decision maker is normally amenable to
considering evidence which bears on his decision options and
that he rarely delegates his decision-making function to a
researcher. This requires that researchers develop
techniques presenting concise, meaningful analysis which
considers the multi-dimensional nature of most real-world
decisions. Due to this multi-dimensional aspect, the
authors reject a number of possible research techniques in
favor of itulti-attribute utility measurement. The article
extends previous work done with MAUT and presents a
practical application which "...is oriented toward easy
communication and use in environments in which time is short
and decision makers are numerous and busy. Further, it is a
method that is psychologically meaningful to decision




In the course of the article, the authors develop a
blue-print for application of HAUT. Their outline is
applied to an examination of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare»s Office of Child Development.
Circumstances surrounding their evaluation closely parallel
many aspects of the study of proliferating Third World sea
denial capabilities. In both cases decision makers within
the executive and legislative branches are numerous and are
under extreme time pressures. Both problems are multi-
dimensional and are not adequately dealt with by existing
measurement systems. Their outline has been used as a
framework for this and the following chapter.
Figure 10 presents a block diagram adapted from the
Edwards et al. article which describes the flow of the
current study. In the diagram rectangles enclose operations
conducted in the course of the study and circles contain
informational inputs and outputs from operations. Each of
the operations and informational inputs/outputs will be
described in detail with the aid of a ten-step procedure
also adapted from the Edwards article. The first five steps


















































Figure 10 PROCEDURAL FLOW DIAGRAM
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the study and will be presented in this chapter. The
remaining five steps concern aggregating information and
applying aggregated judgments to existing naval systems.
The final five steps are the subject of Chapter V.
A. STEP 1—IDENTIFY ISSUE (S) FOR STUDY
The sea denial capability of Third World nations is the
issue being studied. Concerns generated by recent Third
World naval expansion programs were presented in Chapters I
and II. Nc further discussion of trends among lesser
developed nations is required. However, the importance of
this type of examination cannot be overstated. It is
essential that the researcher develop a thorough
appreciation cf the central issue and its ramifications.
Without this sclid foundation it is impossible to conduct a
meaningful investigation of the type of complex real-world
issues presented in an evaluation of sea denial
capabilities
.
B. STEP 2— IDENTIFY ENTITIES TO BE EVALUATED
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There was general agreement among naval spokesmen that
anti-ship missile surface combatant and torpedo-firing
diesel submarine acquisitions by Third World nations
represent the greatest sea denial threat. Because these two
naval weapons systems provide the basis for Third World sea
denial capabilities, they are the entities which will be
evaluated in this study. Again, adequate discussion of the
expert's concerns was contained in the preceding chapters.
No elaboration is required, except to note that once again
the researcher must be well acquainted with the issue
involved in order to identify the central entities.
C. STEP 3—IEENTIPY PARTICIPANTS
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory depends upon subjective
judgments of experts to develop utility curves. The
dominant consideration is that the participants possess
expertise which will allow them to make the required
judgments. The theory is not dependent upon large sample
sizes.
Quantifying the military worth of anti-ship missile
combatants and diesel submarines required the involvement of
71

two distinct groups of experts. Since judges with the
required expertise were not available at the Naval
Postgraduate School, opinions had to be elicited through
questionnaires. Judges for the anti-ship missile sea denial
questionnaire were drawn from the relatively small number of
persons within the O.S. Navy with experience in anti-ship
missile combatants, personnel involved in the HARPOON SSM
development program, and analysts dealing with the anti-ship
missile threat.
The anti-ship missile combatant questionnaire was
eventually distributed to 1 8 individuals. Six of the
persons had operational experience with anti-ship missiles
and/or surface-to-surface missile combatants. Six were
involved in U.S. Navy SSM development programs in a variety
of capacities. Six recipients were analysts who evaluate
the anti-ship missile threat to the U.S. Navy.
The diesel submarine questionnaire was eventually
distributed to fourteen persons. Three are officers
currently assigned to O.S. diesel submarines. The remaining
eleven officers have served aboard U.S. diasel submarines
within the last two years.
12

The limited number of available experts placed special
pressures on the questionnaire construction process involved
in Step 5. Additional persons at the Naval Postgraduate
School were utilized in Steps 4 and 5 in order to ensure
that the questionnaires which were developed were effective
instruments for measuring the relevant dimensions of the
issue. Their participation will be outlined in the
remaining portions of this chapter.
D. STEP 4—IDENTIFY RELEVANT DIMENSIONS
The relevant dimensions are weapon system performance
characteristics which determine sea denial potential of
systems under study. Had expertise been more readily
available, a group of judges might have been gathered to
develop the utility curves, or alternatively, to assist in
questionnaire construction. The lack of accessible
expertise forced the researcher to examine available
information concerning SSM-eguipped combatants and diesel
submarines and to develop a list of performance
characteristics normally associated with the systems under
study. The lists were discussed with knowledgeable
individuals available at the Naval Postgraduate School. The
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anti-ship missile combatant characteristics were presented
tc two officers who had commanded ASHVILLE PGs and two
officers with knowledge of naval missiles. Two officers
with attack submarine backgrounds were consulted concerning
the submarine characteristics. The conversations lead to a
number of deletions and additions of criteria deemed
important tc a comprehensive study of the military worth of
these systems.
One example was the attempt to determine the best
measure tc describe a surface combatant's seakeeping
qualities. Seakeeping is difficult to quantify, but it is
very important in evaluating the open-ocean capabilities of
the relatively small platforms which are common in Third
World navies. The preliminary list contained a number of
measures regarding ship size—length, beam, draft and height
of superstructure. All of these measures bear on
seakeeping. However, the former ASHVILLE PG commanders
maintained that standard platform displacement presented the
best measure of platform seakeeping. This was a
particularly attractive measure from the researcher's
viewpoint, because it is easily quantified and aggregates a
number of physical characteristics into one measure.
Aggregated measures were particularly important to
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developing a concise questionnaire which would promote a
high response rate from the judges. The consultations
developed a set of matrices which paired relevant dimensions
with measurable performance criteria. Table II presents the
TABLE II
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matrix which resulted from the anti-ship missile combatant
discussions.
Two important tendencies became evident during the
series of discussions. The first was a desire to tie
general performance characteristics to specific weapons
systems. While this proclivity demonstrated the
individual's previous experiences, it held the potential for
eliciting prejudgments that could affect questionnaire
responses. There was a demonstrated penchant to focus on
the threat from Soviet-built systems, while disregarding
systems exported by Western European nations with which the
individuals were less familiar. Weapon performance criteria
were not associated with specific weapon systems in the
questionnaire to avoid this inclination to heavily weight
Soviet systems.
The second tendency was to tie discussions of
performance criteria to specific scenarios. Much of the
consultation time concerned probable Third World employment
of the weapon systems. The scenario-dependent nature of
these discussions required that the questionnaire outline
scenarios consistent with demonstrated Third World navy




E. STEP 5—SOLICIT EXPERT OPINIONS 7IA QUESTIONNAIRE
The process of developing questionnaires which would be
valid measures of military worth began with constructing
relevant scenarios. Two separate scenarios were developed
for each questionnaire. The first missile boat scenario
outlined guerrilla attacks against either merchant ships or
non-missile surface combatants. It described the threat
which concerned various spokesmen in Chapter II and was in
keeping with the surprise attacks against the CTSS Liberty
and the Israeli "Eilat" in 1967. This scenario required the
missile teat to transit to normal sea lanes or ocean
operatng areas for the attack. Past patterns suggested that
the attacker would make maximum use of surprise by
conducting a high speed attack, possibly at night. The
scenario assumed that air cover was not available for either
early warning or target localization/identification.
The second anti-ship missile scenario addressed a
war-at-sea situation in line with naval engagements which
took place in October 1973. As was previously discussed,
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NAOT is not a combat modeling tool. However, it was useful
to consider the capabilities of various platforms in a
one-on-one situation in an effort to quantify the typical
naval balance considerations. Again, the scenario assumed
that neither side had air support and that the engagements
tested the open ocean capabilities of the units involved.
Equivalent scenarios were developed for diesel
submarines. The first involved guerrilla attacks of the
type attributed to Libya in the opening chapter. The
scenario assumed a submarine transit to normal sea lanes and
an attack in a situation most favorable to the submarine.
No airborne ASW support was available.
The second submarine scenario was set in a war-at-sea
situation. There was general agreement among the operators
that the targets for the submarines would probably be enemy
surface ships along the lines of Pakistani attacks in 1970,
rather than enemy submarines. This is reasonable, given the
complexities of submarine ASW, and the fact that few
potential Third World conflicts involve two nations which
both possess diesel submarines. In keeping with the
Indo-Pakistani example, the scenario assumed that the
surface unit was alert to the possibility of attack but
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lacked airborne ASW support.
Other possible concerns entered into formulations cf the
questionnaire instructions. The basic concepts of utility
theory and utility curves probably are new concepts for many
judges. It was necessary to briefly describe the concepts.
A curve was borrowed from the LeGrow study and was presented
as an example accompanied by a brief interpretation.
Discussions with various classmates demonstrated that the
use of this example was an effective and concise method for
acquainting the respondent with the concept of utility
curves.
The interpretation which accompanied the curve defined
the zero point as a "natural" origin--a necessary assumption
for developing a ratio scale from MAUT. 80 The
interpretation made it clear that a zero point was demanded
of the judge and that a score of zero for a particular
characteristic represented the absolute minimum value for
that attribute which would allow successful accomplishment
of the mission outlined in the scenario. "If the analyst is
willing to generalize the validity of this point it can be
considered a 'natural* origin and lead to ratio
measurement." 81 This interpretation of the zero point was
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emphasized in a number of contexts in each questionnaire.
Similar emphasis was placed on the upper limit of the
utility curve. In theory the maximum utility value is one.
However, most individuals consulted in the preliminary
studies were more comfortable using whole numbers and a
maximum cf ten than they were using one as the upper limit.
As a result, the scales in the questionnaires extended from
a minimum of one to a maximum of ten. Since ratio
measurement is being assumed, this enlargement is
permissible. Ten was emphasized throughout the
questionnaire as the value for an attribute which the judge
considered technologically feasible/desirable. 82
Tests of .various questionnaire formats indicated that
the precision of the curves and the accuracy of the judge's
sketch could be improved by asking for his minimum and
maximum utility points prior to asking him to sketch the
curve for each attribute. This format was utilized in the
final version of each questionnaire. This effort to promote
accuracy had definite benefits when the results were
aggregated (see Chapter V) .
Finally, special efforts were taken to emphasize that
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each judge was chosen because of his expertise and that the
questionnaire sought subjective judgments based on that
experience. It also was noted that each attribute should be
considered to be independent of all others. The judge was
directed to emit those characteristics which he did not feel
qualified to evaluate.
The final step in the preparation process was to submit
copies of the proposed questionnaire to three qualified
judges at the Naval Postgraduate School who had not been
consulted about the project previously. Two were given the
questionnaire contained in Appendix B and one received the
diesel submarine questionnaire in Appendix C. In each case
the judge had no difficulty understanding what was expected
of him. All aspects of the instructions were followed
completely. The judges were in agreement that the
questionnaires were extremely challenging and called for the
judge to weigh very difficult trade-offs throughout. Each
judge noted that it took 45 minutes to one hour to complete
the questionnaire--a fact which seemed to threaten the
desired high response rate. Because an all-inclusive
measure of system military worth was more important to the
research than a wide sample of judge's opinion, the
questionnaires contained in Appendix B and C were submitted
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to the prospective respondents without modification
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V. DEVELOPING SEA DENIAL CAPABILITY SCORES
This chapter presents the final five steps in the
process of developing utility scores representing the sea
denial capabilities of the antiship missile combatants and
diesel submarines which have been transferred to Third World
nations. It begins with the process involved in measuring
the dimensions under study and traces the steps utilized to
acguire platform capability scores. The final step in the
chapter is the presentation of these utility scores to the
decision maker.
A. STEP 6— MEAS0BE DIMENSIONS
The individual performance characteristics of antiship
missile ccmbatants and torpedo^firing diesel submarines
found in Third World inventories constitute the dimensions
to be evaluated. Measurement of these dimensions was
involved in varying degrees at three points in the
guantif ication of weapon system's military worth. A
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preliminary examination was required in the questionnaire
preparation phase outlined in Step 4. That investigation
sought to identify dimensions which presented meaningful
measures of system performance. The second inquiry formed
part of Step 5. In Step 5 the investigation was aimed at
developing an appreciation of the range among weapons with
respect tc particular dimensions in order to provide a
realistic scale for the horizontal axis for each curve
required cf the judges in the questionnaires.
The in-depth examination of performance characteristics
involved in Step 6 was a time-consuming process. However,
the period cf time between mailing and subsequent receipt of
the questionnaires was sufficient to accomplish this
analysis. Specific performance and inventory information
was collected from various unclassified publications.
Prominent sources were Aviation Week and Space Technology,
«2§2£is *sa£ons Systems, Jane' s Fighting Ships, Fli ght
International, SIPBI publications and The World Military
Balance.
Unexpected delays were encountered in two areas during
the measurement process. In developing antiship missile
platform inventory numbers the researcher encountered
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difficulties in deciphering names of missile combatants
found in various Third World nations' inventories. An
example of the difficulties encountered is the fact that the
Iranian SAAM-class is in reality the VOSPEH MK-5, the
Malaysian PERKASA FPB is produced as the BRAVE PTGL as is
the Libyan SOOSA FPB. (These nomenclature difficulties are
minimized in Appendix A by presenting the manufacturer's
designations, rather than class names assigned by recipient
nations tc various types of antiship combatants.)
The second source of time delay was the extensive mix of
weapons systems and combatant platforms; the individualized
nature of supporting systems such as ECM/DECM and
anti-missile defensive systems; and the wide variation in
types of torpedoes capable of being fired by each class of
submarine. To illustrate the individualized nature of
various platforms, consider the fact that the LA C0M3ATTANTS
II PTFG normally carries four EXOCET SSMs, but that the
Malaysian version of the LA COMBATTANTE II carries two
EXOCETs, Singapore's version mounts five GABSIEL SSMs, while
Iran has ordered LA C0M3ATTANTE II PTFGs without missiles
and may intend to mount HARPOON SSMs on these units. 83 This
degree of diversity required that each be treated as a
separate system, since diveristy in armament portends
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possible differences in sea denial potential. This
diversity greatly increased the effort devoted to the
measurement phase of the research.
Measurement is also complicated by the fact that MAUT
requires precise and complete information. Information
about performance characteristics forms the basis for the
valuation of military worth and must be complete to allow
side-by-side comparisons of the military worth of various
weapon systems. MAUT does not accomodate missing data. The
absence of data for a particular dimension of one system
reguires that that characteristic be deleted for all systems
in order to make side-by-side comparisons.
One deletion became necessary in the study of the
military worth of antiship missile combatants. The
preliminary research done in Steps 4 and 5 indicated that
the necessary performance information was available to allow
inclusion of "Maximum Radar Acquisition Range" in the
questionnaire contained in Appendix B. The detailed
examination done in Step 6 revealed that range information
per se was net available for a number of radars mounted on
Third World antiship missile combatants. Instead, radar
information is often presented in the form of technical
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characteristics such as pulse repetition rate, frequency,
power, etc. The reason that the technical characteristics,
rather than range information, are given may arise from the
fact that radar ranges are extremely sensitive to
atmospheric conditions. Factors, such as the ducting
phenomenon fcund over-water in warm climates, can greatly
alter radar acquisition ranges. The fact that this
characteristic is variable and subject to conditions
unrelated tc performance characteristics of a particular
radar required that this dimension be deleted subsequent to
mailing the questionnaires to the judges.
B. STEP 7— AGGHEGATE UTILITY CUHVES
Literature concerning multi-attribute utility analysis
deals at length with problems involved in aggregating
individual utilities into group utility functions. The
discussion centers around theoretical constraints upon the
manner in which individual utility curves can be combined. 84
Attention has also been devoted to the practical
difficulties involved in aggregating utilities in a
real-world decision-making situation. 85
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Edwards €t al. reviewed the literature and concluded
that averaging presented an acceptable method for resolving
disagreement among judges. 86 There are two tasic ways to
average the curves received in the judges* questionnaire
responses. Each will be discussed in turn. The curves for
"Range at Maximum Sustained Speed" (Scenario #1) taken from
Appendix D will serve as the basis for discussion in Steps
7, 8 and 9. These curves are reproduced in Pigure 11.
One approach is to combine the individual curves into
one agreed-upon utility curve for each dimension involved in
the analysis. This might be accomplished through a Delphi
instrument or might be accomplished by mathematically
combining the individual curves provided by the judges.
There are a number of problems with the Delphi technique
which go fceycnd the scope of the present study.
Disadvantages also accompany the mathematical combination
approach.
The mathematical solution requires relatively involved
manipulations which counter the goal of developing an
application cf MAUT which is easily explained to a decision
maker. Presenting a single curve for each dimension also








500 1000 1500 2000 2500 NM
Range at Maximum Sustained Speed
(Scenario #1)
Figure 11 - CURVES FOR "RANGE AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINED SPEED"
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impression that the judges reached a consensus when, in
fact, a wide divergence of opinion with respect to a given
dimension might exist. So, for example, the curve presented
in Figure 12 for the dimension "Range at Maximum Sustained
Speed" is much more visually appealing than the ten curves
presented in Figure 11, but it does not display the degree
of agreement/disagreement which existed among the judges.
The mathematical complexities and the possible
misrepresentation of consensus led to the adoption of a
second method for aggregating utility values.
The second approach involves using the judges* utility
curves directly to average the values for each dimension.
So, for example, to determine the average utility value for
a platform with a 1250 NM range at maximum sustained speed
it would be necessary to take ten individual readings as
shown in Figure 13. The values of the readings are summed
(total value of 37 for this example) and this utility value
is divided by the number of judges (10 in this case) to
derive the average utility for this dimension for a platform
with a 1250 NM range (8.7 in this example.)
The disadvantage inherent in this approach is obvious.
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500 1000 1250 1500 2000 2500 NM
Range at Maximum Sustained Speed
(Scenario #1)
Figure 13 - UTILITY VALUES FOR 1250 NM RANGE
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been the case if a combined curve had been used allowing the
utility value to be read directly off the vertical axis.
However, three advantages appear to out-weigh this drawback.
First, the mathematics are easily understood and easily
demonstrated. Second, the method avoids much of the
theoretical discussion about the proper manner for
developing group utility functions by going directly to the
curves provided by the individual judges. Third, the method
presents a visual representation of the variance in the
judges' opinion. This advantage is very important because
simple mathematical measures of variance and standard
deviation ar€ not applicable. A normal distribution has not
been assumed. Moreover, the degree of variance depends upon
the particular value for a dimension being studied. In the
case of the dimension "Range at Maximum Sustained Speed" a
visual inspection reveals that the variance in judges'
opinions at the 1250 NM point is much less than the wide
ranging judgments found at the 750 NM value. A visual
representation cf the degree of agreement/disagreement is
vital to an unbiased presentation of the data in the absence
of standard mathematical representations of variance. The
decision maker should also be appraised of the fact that the
degree of agreement/ disagreement may vary among dimensions.
A comparison cf the curves presented in Figure 13, for
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example, reveals far greater agreement than the curves for
"Maximum Missile Range" (Scenario #2) shown in Figure 14.
Judges 1 curves for each dimension addressed in the
antiship missile combatant questionnaire are contained in
Appendix D. The curves for the dimensions included in the
torpedo- firing diesel submarine questionnaire are displayed
in Appendix E. Responses for the non-continuous variables
presented in the respective questionnaires are also
contained in the appropriate appendixes in tabular form.
Twelve responses were received for the antiship missile
combatant questionnaire (66 percent response rate) and six
were received for the diesel submarine questionnaire (50
percent response rate) . The fact that some judges did not
evaluate various dimensions accounts for the variation in
total numbers of responses among individual performance
characteristics.
C. STEP 8—AGGREGATE IMPORTANCE WEIGHTINGS
Literature concerning applications for utility analysis
devotes much space to the problem of properly weighting




10 20 30 40 50 NM
Maximum Effective Range of the Missile
(Scenario #2)
Figure 14 - UTILITY CORVES FOR "MAXIMUM MISSILE RANGE"
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methodology should allow for an open display of the weight
being given to different people's preferences." 87 Edwards
et al . address the problem of properly weighting their
dimensions. 88 The concern in their study was that judgments
might be overstated/understated unless the judges assigned
weightings tc the dimensions to reflect the importance
attached to each dimension. LeGrow expressed the same
concern and asked the judges to provide weightings for
aircraft performance characteristics along with the utility
curves. 89 The weightings in the LeGrow study showed that
some performance characteristics were more important to
fighter aircraft capability than others. 90 The same
situation was highly probable in an application of MAUT to
sea denial capability.
In the sea denial study each judge was asked to weight
each performance characteristic which he evaluated in the
questionnaire. The individual weightings were averaged to
develop overall weightings for each attribute. Table III
presents the resultant average weightings for each of the
performance characteristics contained in the antiship
missile combatant questionnaire contained in Appendix E.
Table IV presents the same information for the
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Appendix C. Once again some of the experts did not judge
certain dimensions. This accounts for the divergence in
numbers of responses.
The average weightings for the various dimensions are
used to develop weighted utility scores. For the platform
with the 1250 NM range the average utility score developed
in Step 7 (8.7) is multiplied by the average weighting found
under Scenario #1 in Table III. The resultant weighted
attribute score for "Range at Maximum Sustained Speed" for
this particular platform would be 50.
D. STEP 9—CALCULATE WEAPON SYSTEM UTILITIES
The result of the procedures contained in Step 7 and
Step 8 is a series of weighted utility scores for dimensions
of sea denial weapons systems. The purpose of Step 9 is to
combine these weighted utilities to develop platform utility
scores for antiship missile combatants and torpedo-firing
diesel surmarines.
The process to be followed in combining these weighted
utility scores is determined by the presence or absence of
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three properties within the utility functions. These three
properties; utility independence, pairwise preferential
independence, and pairwise marginality , are presented in
some detail in the LeGrow thesis. 91 The presence or atsence
of these properties determines whether an additive or
multiplicative combinatorial relationship exists. If the
requirements for addition or multiplication are not present,
or are not decipherable, most sources recommend the additive
form as the best "...since it is generally a good
approximation of the multi-attribute utility function." 92
The diesel submarine and the missile combatant
questionnaires explicitly noted interrelationships which
exist between various performance characteristics the judge
was asked to evaluate. The experts were involved in making
difficult trade-offs throughout the evaluation process.
Intertwining characteristics involved in these complex
systems made the requirements for addition or multiplication
indiscernable. Thus, the recommended additive form was
adopted. Total utility scores for a particular weapon
system were derived by summing the weighted utility scores
derived in Steps 7 and 8.
Total utility scores for the antiship missile combatants
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were greatly influenced by the performance characteristics
of the missile systems mounted on these combatants. Seven
of the thirteen dimensions ("Maximum Effective Range of the
Missile", "Missile Speed", "Warhead Size", "Missile Hit
Probability", "Missile Guidance Systems", "Home-on- Jam
Capability" and "Euzing Configuration") directly evaluate
the performance of the missile. An eighth factor ("Number
of Missile Tubes") is indirectly tied to missile
characteristics such as size and weight. The MAUT technique
permits a sid€-by-side comparison of system components such
as the surface-to-surface missiles which have been
transferred to various Third World recipients. The total
utility scores were computed for the antiship missiles and
are presented in Table V.
TABLE V
ANTISHIP MISSILE UTILITY SCORES



















Scores presented in Table V were derived by summing the
weighted utility scores for the seven dimensions cited in
the previous paragraph. The scores represent the maximum
sea denial potential for each system. In each case the
maximum range of the missile was used to calculate the
system scores. The two systems with over-the-horizon
capabilities were scored on the basis of their maximum
effective ranges (37.5 NM for the 0T0MAT 93 and in excess of
50 NM for the HARPOON 94 ) . The ducting phenomenon which can
extend radar acquisition ranges over warm ocean areas and
the concentration of Third World recipients in these areas
makes over-the-horizon targeting possible in many
situations. Range considerations had the opposite effect on
the scores for the relatively short range (14 NM) GABRIEL
SSM. 95 While the scores for the GABRIEL might appear to
underestimate the military worth of this system, they are
consistent with the evaluations of Israeli weapons designers
who are involved in design and testing of the GABRIEL II SSM
which has an expanded range (26 NM) 96 with improved guidance
and higher speed. 97
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The missile system scores constitute part of antiship
combatant scores displayed in Table VI and Table 711. These
tables encompass all combinations of missiles and combatants
found in Third World navies and those projected for the
foreseeable future with the exception of the NANOCHKA which
may be be delivered to India (see Appendix A). 98 The tables
demonstrate the impact of the missile scores on overall
platform scores. Technological considerations also play an
important rcle in determining platform scores. The
inclusion of ECM/DECM equipment and sophisticated antiship
missile defense systems, such as the Gatling rapid-fire
weapon, greatly influence the scores and relative rankings
of the various platforms. The relative importance of speed
and defensive capability in Scenario #2 is reflected in
Table VII. In addition, the relatively higher scores in
Scenario #2 show the impact of including a fourteenth
characteristic ("Antiship Missile Defense Systems") to the
evaluation.
Similar scores for torpedo- firing diesel submarines are
provided in Table VIII. Contrary to the pattern encountered
with the uissile combatants, submarines of a particular




ANIISHIP MISSILE COMBATANT UTILITY SCORES
Scenario #1
LA CCMBAIIANTE III PTFG (4 EXOCET) 377
DARING LEGS (8 EXOCET) 376
PR-72 PTFG (4 OTOMAT) 373
LOTA DDGS (6 STYX) 372
LUPO DDGS (4 OTOMAT) 371
G02DYY DDGS (4 STYX) 371
LA CCMBA1TANTE II PTFG (4 EXOCET) 368
LEANEEB DEGSP (4 EXOCET) 368
FLETCHER DDGS (4 EXOCET) 364
36.2-METER PTG (2 EXOCET) 364
ALMIEAN1E WILLIAMS DDGSP (4 EXOCET) 363
LA COMBATTANTE II PTFG (4 HARPOON) 363
PR-72 PIFG (4 EXOCET) 363
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (4 EXOCET) 359
VOSPER HK-10 DDGSP (4 EXOCET) 356
U.S. PCEG (4 HARPOON) 355
SUMNER EEGS {4 EXOCET) 354
LUPO DDGS (2 OTOMAT) 352
LA CCMBATTANTE II PTFG (2 EXOCET) 349
OSA I/II PTFG (4 STYX) 347
ASHVILLE PGG (2 HARPOON) 347
RIGA DEGS (2 STYX) 346
SHITEY EEGS (2 STYX) 346
FLETCHER DDGS (2 HARPOON) 340




SPRUANCE DDGS (2 HARPOON) 324
ASHVILLE PGG (4 STANDARD) 321
KOMAR PIG (2 STYX) 315
FLETCHER DDGS (4 STANDARD) 314
RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG (8 GABRIEL) 308
BATTLE EDGSP (4 STANDARD) 307
SUMNER DDGS (4 STANDARD) 304
ASHVILLE PGG (2 STANDARD) 302
SAAH III PTG (6 GABRIEL) 297
GEARING DDGS (2 STANDARD) 295
RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG (4 GABRIEL^ 294
SAAR II PTG (5 GABRIEL) 292
LA CCMBAITANTE II PTFG (5 GABRIEL) 291
LORSEN 45-METER PTFG (5 GABRIEL) 282
FLETCHEE DDGS (4 GABRIEL) 282
SUMNER CDGS (4 GABRIEL) 272
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (3 GABRIEL) 271
VOSPEE 8K-5 DDGS (4 SEAKILLER) 254
P-48 PGMGL (8 SS-12) 202




AKTISHIP MISSILE COMBATANT UTILITY SCORES
Scenario #2
LA CCMBATTANTE III PTFG (4 EXOCET) 502
LA CCMEATTANTE II PTFG (4 EXOCET) 487
LA CCMEATTANTE II PTFG (4 HARPOON) 487
ALMIEANIE WILLIAMS DDGSP (4 EXOCET) 479
LEANEER EEGSP (4 EXOCET) 475
LA CCMEATTANTE II PTFG (2 EXOCET) 472
DARING EDGS (8 EXOCET) 468
FLETCHER DDGS (4 EXOCET) 461
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (4 EXOCET) 459
LOPO DDGS (4 OTOMAT) 459
GEARING DDGS (2 STANDARD) 457
FLETCHER DDGS (4 STANDARD) 451
ASHVILLE PGG (4 STANDARD) 449
SUMNER EDGS (4 EXOCET) 447
PR-72 PTFG (4 EXOCET) 446
FLETCHER DDGS (2 HARPOON) 446
ASHVILLE PGG (2 HARPOON) 444
LUPQ DDGS (2 OTOMAT) 444
U.S. PCEG (4 HARPOON) 443
RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG (8 GABRIEL) 440
SAAR III PTFG (6 GABRIEL) 439
GOREYY EDGS (4 STYX) 439
BATTLE EDGSP (4 STANDARD) 439
PR-72 ETFG (4 OTOMAT) 438




SAAB II PTG (5 GABRIEL) 436
ASHVILLE PGG (2 STANDARD) 424
RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG (4 GABRIEL) 424
LOTA DDGS (6 STYX) 424
LA COMEATTANTE II PTFG (5 GABRIEL) 421
36.2-METER PTG (2 EXOCET) 416
VOSPER KK-10 DDGS (4 EXGCETJ 404
RIGA DEGS (2 STYX) 401
SPROANCE DDGS (2 HARPOON) 400
OSA I/II PTFG (4 STYX) 396
VOSPER 37-METER PTFG (2 OTOMAT) 394
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (5 GABRIEL) 393
FLETCHEE DDGS (4 GABRIEL) 393
WHITEY DDGS (2 STYX) 389
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (3 GABRIEL) 382
SUMNER IEGS (4 GABRIEL) 379
KOMAR PTG (2 STYX) 374
VOSPER MK-5 DCGS (4 SEAKILLER) 334
ERAVE PTGL (8 SS-12) 216




TCfiPEDO-FIRING DIESEL SUBMARINE UTILITY SCORES
Scenario #1 Scenario #2
GUPPY III SS 412 TYPE 206/500 SS 484
TANG SS 410 TYPE 209 SS 476
GUPPY IA SS 407 GUPPY IA SS 442
GUPPY IIA SS 402 CBERON SS 440
HAN SS (N) 401 AGOSTA SS 439
GUPPY II SS 396 HAN SS (N) 435
FOXTROT SS 387 GUPPY II SS 426
TYPE 209 SS 386 TANG SS 425
GOLF SSE 375 FOXTROT SS 422
TYPE 206/5G0 SS 374 GUPPY IIA SS 421
AGOSTA SS 373 GUPPY III SS 417
CBERON SS 371 MING SS 415
MING SS 361 GOLF SSB 413
fiQMEO SS 348 DAPHNE SS 400
EAPHNE SS 347 ROMEO SS 387
WHISKEY SS 331 WHISKEY SS 348
1-CONVERSICN SS 326 T-CONVERSION SS 315
EALAO SS 284 BALAO SS 284
TIBURON SS 257 TIBURON SS 232
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So, for example, a North Korean ROMEO SS is essentially the
same as a Chinese (PRC) ROMEO or an Egyptian unit of the
same class. The major exceptions to this rule come in two
areas where the supplier retains a degree of control. One
area of variation is in the electronics suit which is
transferred along with the submarine. The second
differentiation is in the types of torpedoes provided as
part of the purchase package. For example, the West German
decision to export wire-guided torpedoes with the TYPE 206
and TYPE 209 submarines plays a major role in determining
the relatively high scores which these units received in
Scenario #2. In like manner, the Soviets could greatly
upgrade the sea denial scores for their exports, especially
the FOXTROT SSs, by providing more sophisticated torpedoes
to recipient nations.
Most of the submarines appearing in Table VIII have the
capability tc fire a variety of torpedoes. The submarine
capability scores were developed by calculating the total
utility scores for each of the torpedoes which have been
transferred sith each type of submarine (a combination of
the scores for "Torpedo Speed", "Effective Range of the
Torpedo", "Torpedo Guidance System") and selecting the
torpedo with the highest score for inclusion in the total
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score for that class of submarine. In cases where one
torpedo had a higher score in one scenario and a second
torpedo scored higher in the other scenario, the second
torpedo wculd be used for the second scoring. So, for
example, the French Z-16 torpedo was used to compute utility
scores for the French AGOSTA SS in Scenario #1, while the
E-12 scored highest for the AGOSIA SS in Scenario #2 and was
used in making that calculation.
This method for determining maximum platform capability
is consistent with an effort to portray the maximum sea
denial capability of the platforms under consideration. It
is also consistent with the assumption that the Third World
military planner would load his submarines with the optimal
torpedoes for the anticipated mission. The inclusion cf the
GOLF SSB is also consistent with an examination of maximum
sea denial potential. While an antiship role is not the
primary mission cf an SSB, its 10 torpedo tubes do give it
an antiship capability." The PRC's single HAN SS (N) was
included because it is still not certain whether the unit is
diesel or nuclear powered. 100
The submarine scores present an opportunity for
comparing MAUT-derived scores to real-world circumstances.
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The list encapsulates historical trends in submarine
production for various submarine builders. The Soviets
began production of the WHISKEY SS in 1951*0*, switched to
production cf the ROMEO SS in 1958-61*02 an a produced the
FOXTROT SS beginning in 1958, but continued production until
1967 — well after ROMEO production had ceased. 1 ^ 3 These
production choices would be expected to reflect successive
increases in the military worth of the diesel submarines
being produced. The MAUT scores reflect an increasing sea
denial capability for each successive class cf submarine in
both of the scenarios outlined in the guesticnnaire. The
same holds true for the French transition from DAPHNE SS
production to building the AGOSTA SS; the U.S. improvements
going frcm the TIBORON SS to the BALAO SS to the GUPPY and
TANG SSs; and the British shift from the T-CONVERSION SS to
OBERON SS series production. The consistency of the results
appears to demonstrate the usefulness of the MAUT technique
and have the added advantage of quantifying apparent
increases in military worth of various diesel submarines.
E. STEP 10—PRESENT SCORES TO DECISION MAKER
Most decision makers concerned with arms transfers and
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sea denial threats are not acquainted with the concept of
utility analysis. The use of MAUT-derived scores to assist
the decision maker may require a brief explanation of the
technique. Ihe fact that the curves which form the basis
for MAUT represent expert judgments should be emphasized.
Presenting representative curves may be helpful in
familiarizing the decision maker with the approach used in
the preceeding nine steps. The scores contained in Tables V
through VIII can be presented following a brief explanation.
In presenting MAUT analysis it may become necessary to
caution against drawing unwarranted conclusions from the
scores. One tendency is to attempt implicit combat modeling
based on MAUT scores. It is very tempting to postulate from
the scores fcr Scenario #2 that a Libyan PR-72 with EXCCET
missiles should prevail over an Egyptian OSA PTFG in a
one-on-one situation. However, MAUT scores cannot be used
for combat modeling. Tendencies to misuse these utility
scores must te countered with explanations that MAUT scores
present rule-of-thumb indices of military worth which offer
all of the advantages of quantification on a ratio scale,
but that they do not predict combat outcomes.
Another tendency likely to be encountered is the desire
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to focus en the ranking of various systems without noting
the degree of difference between their scores. For
instance, it is easy to sieze on the fact that the LA
C0MEAITAN1E II PTFG/EXOCET SSM combination is ranked first
in the Scenario #1 utility scores. The fact that the
LEANDER DEGSF/EXOCET weapon system which ranks eighth scores
only 2 percent below the LA COMBATTANTE II is important and
must be brought out in the discussion. MAUT does not allow
the precision necessary to make a differentiation which is
as small as this. Instead, the first eight to ten units on
the Scenario #1 list may be said to have approximately the
same sea denial potential. At the same time, however, it
can be said that the top group exhibits a significantly
higher sea denial potential than those units which appear in
the bottom half of the list.
The decision maker should also be cautioned against
reading too nuch into scenario related/dependent scores.
The utility values presented in the preceeding tables do not
represent all-inclusive statements about the military worth
of the weapons involved. A ship designed primarily for ASW
which mounts a minimal antiship missile capability would be
expected to score poorly in comparison with systems such as
the LA CCMEAITANTE II PTFG which were designed with the
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missions outlined in the scenarios in mind. The scores say
nothing about the overall military worth of the weapon
systems being evaluated and the tendency to take the scores
out of the context framed in the scenarios must be guarded
against. The advantages of quantifying the threat discussed
in the preceding chapters should be emphasized and the
MAOT-derived scores should be offered as a tool which can
assist in assessing the sea denial threat from lesser
developed nations.
The platforms themselves offer a potential threat as
demonstrated ty the sea denial capabilities scores.
However, one important factor remains to be considered. A
protlem often discussed with respect to the transfer of
sophisticated weapons to Third World nations is the
ccuntries* ability/inability to effectively maintain and
operate these systems. Clearly, if the recipients of the
systems discussed thus far are unable to operate them
effectively cutside their home ports the potential sea
denial capabilities will not be realized. The development
of personnel scores and the computation of national sea




VI. INCORPORATING HUMAN FACTORS
The military capabilities of lesser developed nations
depend in large part on their ability to successfully employ
advanced weapon systems. Questions concerning the ability
to absorb the weapons, the adequacy of maintenance, the
competence of the operators, the general technological skill
level of the population, and the presence of foreign
technicians and instructors become of prime importance. The
questions are particularly applicable to the naval threat
described in Chapters I and II. Systems which are not
adequately maintained cannot put to sea. Antiship missile
combatants lacking trained crews cannot effectively utilize
the firepower inherent in the weapons platform. Maintenance
and crew proficiency play an even greater role in submarine
operations. Logistics and supply problems can further
exacerbate difficulties which confront Third World navies.
The importance of personnel-related factors has long
been recognized. These influences have traditionally been
addressed in a rather general manner and are normally
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presented as subjective assessments made by the analyst.
Rattinger reccgnized the need to include personnel factors
in his quantification scheme, but merely devised a very
general measurement device. 104 LeGrow dealt with the
problem by asking his judge to assign scores to various
nations* capabilities to operate fighter aircraft. He
incorporated these scores into his MAUT-derived capability
scores. io 5 LeGrow's methodology resulted in ratio-level
scores which could be combined with platform utility scores
to measure the air combat capabilities of various nations.
However, his approach lacked the precision available with
other judgmental techniques. It would also have been
difficult to apply to scale a large number of instances such
as the 37 nations which have acquired antiship missile
combatants and/or torpedo-firing diesel submarines.
The difficulties prompted a search for an alternative
scaling technique which could accomodate the relatively
large number of cases involved in the study. The
investigation of judgmental scaling methods was further
constrained by the requirement that the technique provide
ratio-level information which could be mathematically
combined with platform utility scores. The Constant Sum
Method meets these requirements. The Constant Sum Method is
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a well established scaling technique which dates back to the
1930's. It was improved and modified in the period leading
up to the publication of Torgerson's Theory and Methods of
Scaling in 1S58.io*
The method calls upon the judge to consider every
possible pair of instances. Within each pair the judge is
asked to divide 100 points between the two instances "...in
accordance with the absolute ratio of the greater to the
lesser." 107 For example, a 50-50 split would indicate a
judgment that the two instances were of egual magnitude,
while an 80-20 division would indicate that the former was
four times as large as the latter. The judge is called upon
to evaluate n(n-1)/2 pairs of instances if there are n
instances to scale. So, for the 37 nations possessing
antiship missile combatants and/or diesel submarines, the
judge would have to evaluate 666 pairs of instances. (This
was an obvious area of concern which will be addressed in
the next section.) Internal inconsistencies which might
occur within this large group of judgments are minimized by
applying a least-squares fit to the data received from the
judges. (An in-depth example of the constant sum
methodology with accompanying discussion is presented in
Torgerson.) l ° 8 The Constant Sum methodology provides
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ratio-level data. It also is capable of measuring the
personnel factors which influence military capabilities of
the relatively large number of nations included in the
present study. What is more important, however, is the fact
that it permiits a greater degree of precision than the
LeGrow approach and combines the judgments of numerous
experts into a single capability scale. These advantages
led to the adoption of the Constant Sura technique to scale
Third World personnel factors related to sea denial
capabilities.
A. QUESTIONNAIRE PREPARATION
The requirement to bring together judges with
wide-ranging knowledge of the capabilities of Third World
navies dictated that evaluations be solicited through
questionnaires. In an era of specialization, with the
attendant tendency for analysts to concentrate on narrowly
defined geographic areas, this general expertise is unusual.
The problem is compounded when the broad expertise must be
coupled with the in-depth knowledge necessary for meaningful
evaluation of specific Third World navies.
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Twenty judges eventually were selected. All were
personally known to the researcher. The judges ranged in
rank from Lieutenant to Commander. Each has had extensive
staff-level experience as a naval analyst. Five had recent
experience as members of U.S. Navy fleet staffs. This
experience carried with it an in-depth appreciation for the
capabilities of navies found within the geographic area in
which their fleet operated.
The questionnaire which was developed (Appendix F) asked
the judge to evaluate Third World nations' capabilities to
successfully operate antiship missile combatants and/or
torpedo- firing diesel submarines in an open ocean sea denial
mission. The instructions suggested that evaluations might
be based in part on a demonstrated capability to perform the
open ocean mission, the presence of the technology and
training necessary for successful accomplishment of the
mission, and the ability of a particular nation to man the
platforms with competent crews. The purpose of the
suggestions was to focus the judg.e*s attention on an
evaluation of the personnel factors, as opposed to the
performance characteristics of the platforms found in the
various naval inventories. The judges' instructions
concluded with a brief explanation of the Constant Sum
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scaling technique and an example accompanied by an
interpretation of the hypothetical results.
The questionnaire was divided into three separate
country lists. Each encompassed a specific geographic
region. Ihis breakdown sought to exploit the expertise of
those judges assigned to the fleet staffs by tailoring a
portion of the questionnaire to fit their operational
expertise in specific geographic areas. The three lists
were linked by including India on Country List #1 and #2 and
by including Israel on Country List #1 and #3.
Sixteen of the twenty questionnaires were returned (80
percent response rate) . The majority of the judges
responded to more than one portion of the questionnaire.
This indicates that the researcher's concern over the length
of the questionnaire and the fact that the judge was being
asked to evaluate a large number of pairs of instances was
largely unfounded.
B. COMPOTE COUNTRY CAPABILITY SCORES
The actual computations used to derive country
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capability scores represent a refinement of the Torgerson
treatment of the Constant Sum Method. 109 The computations
will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs by using
actual judges 1 scores for various Middle Eastern nations
taken from Country List #1. The example is based upon the
scores assigned to Egypt and Israel by the sixteen judges
who evaluated their relative naval capabilities. The
judges' scores for these two nations are displayed in Table
IX. The first step consists of averaging judges' responses
for each nation involved in the study. The average score
for Egypt with respect to Israel is 505 divided by 16 or
3 1.5625 and the average score for Israel is 1095 divided by
16 or 68.4375.
The second step in the computations involves placing
these average scores on an array displayed in part in Table
X. The array for Country List #1 would have 13 rows and 13
columns corresponding to the 13 nations included in the
list. (The averages for Iran and Iraq have been included in
Table X to increase the completeness of the example.)
Scores for particular nations are arrayed to be read down
the columns. Thus, the average score for Egypt compared to
Iran is 44.6875, Egypt compared to Iraq 70.3125, Egypt




JUDGES 1 CAPABILITY SCORES FOR EGYPT AND ISRAEL
Egypt Israel Egypt Israel
Judge #1 35 65 Judge # 9 40 60
Judge #2 35 65 Judge #10 40 60
Judge #3 30 70 Judge #11 35 65
Judge #4 40 60 Judge #12 20 80
Judge #5 30 70 Judge #13 30 70
Judge #6 20 80 Judge #14 50 50
Judge #7 20 80 Judge #15 20 80
Judge #8 40 60 Judge #16 20 80
TABLE X
ARRAY OP AVERAGE CAPABILITY SCORES
Egypt Iran Iraq Israel • • • •
Egypt 50.0000 55. 3125 29..6875 68.4375
Iran 44.6875 50. 0000 29..0625 61.8750
Iraq 70.3125 70. 9375 50,.0000 78.7500
Israel 21.5625 38. 1250 21,.2500 50.0000
124

Step 3 involves constructing a second array displaying
the ratios of the values for pairs of nations. Thus, the
score for Egypt with respect to Iran is 44.6875 divided by
its counterpart across the diagonal depicted in Table XI
(55.3125) to give a score of .80791. The score for Iran
with respect to Egypt is the reciprical of .80791 or
1.23776. In like manner the score for Egypt compared to
Iraq is 36842 divided by .42222 or 5.60945. The reciprocal
(.17827) gives the score for Iraq with respect to Egypt.
The same computations are completed for each pair across the
diagonal cf the array. The resultant array is found in
Table XI. Again, the total array would have 13 rows and 13
columns.
TABLE XI
ARRAY OF RATIO SCORES
Egypt Iran Iraq Israel
Egypt 1.0000 1.2378 0.4222 2. 1683
Iran 0.8079 1.0000 0.4096 1.6229
Iraq 2.3684 2.4409 1.0000 3.7059
Israel 0.4612 0.6162 0.2698 1.0000
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The final step is to take the geometric mean of the
columns. Thus, the score for Egypt would be determined by
the product cf (1) (.80791) f2. 36842) (.4611 9) = 10950.1948
taken to the 1/13 power since there are 13 entries in the
column. The resultant scale value for Egypt is 2.04515.
Similar geometric means taken for each column in turn
determine the scale values for each nation. The scale
values for each of the three country lists are shown in
Table XII. By using the overlapping scores for India and
Israel it is possible to combine the scores into one scale,
The combined scale is displayed in Table XIII.
C. COMBINING PLATFORM AND PERSONNEL-RELATED SCORES
Both the antiship missile combatant and the diesel
submarine questionnaires (Appendix B and C) asked the judges
to evaluate the relative importance of personnel and
platform-related factors to mission success. In each case
the scores were placed on a scale ranging from a minimum of
zero to a maximum of ten. A ratio-level scale was achieved
by defining zero as a natural origin the point at which
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Country Score Country Score
Israel 3.34 Iraq 0.98
China (PRC) 2.56 Peru 0.90
Iran 2.38 Saudi Arabia 0.84
South Africa 2.06 Venezuela 0.84
Egypt 2.05 - Singapore 0.83
India 1.93 Vietnam 0.77
Korea (North) 1.76 Columbia 0.74
Turkey 1.69 Thailand 0. 74
Greece 1.53 Malaysia 0.72
Cuba 1.50 Libya 0.68
Korea (South) 1.39 Algeria 0. 64
Syria 1.39 Ecuador 0.61
Argentina 1.38 Uruguay 0.59
Taiwan 1.38 Morocco 0.53
Brazil 1.34 Tunisia 0.47
Chile 1.05 Brunei 0.34
Pakistan 1.01 Ivory Coast 0.25
Indonesia 1.00
Note: The questionnaire failed to include Somalia
and Senegal. Both have close counterparts in terms
of geographic proximity, similarity of equipment and
supplier, and date of initial equipment acquisition.
Based on these considerations, Senegal has been
assigned Ivory Coast's score of 0.25 and Somalia has




outlined in the scenario. The scores received from the
individual judges are displayed in Table XIV along with the
average scores for the factors and the standard deviations
for each. Only seven of the antiship missile combatant
judges chcse to provide weighting scores, while all of the
submarine questionnaire respondents provided weightings.
The judges 1 replies confirmed the importance of
personnel-related factors in evaluating sea denial
capabilities of lesser developed nations. There was
substantial agreement that personnel-related factors were
more important than platform performance characteristics in
the case cf the missile combatants. In the case of the
diesel submarines, the factors were judged tc be roughly
equivalent. In toth cases the relative importance of the
personnel-related considerations increased in the Scenario
#2 combat situation. The clear implication is that any
assessment of Third World sea denial capabilities which
excludes an evaluation of personnel-related considerations
fails to include an extremely important determinant of the
threat.
The personnel and platform weightings provided by the




HUMAN AND PLATFORM PERFORMANCE WEIGHTINGS
Antiship Missile Combatants (Scenario #1)
Factor Judges' Scores Average Standard
Score Deviation
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9
Human
Performance 8 6 10 8 10 10 10 8.9 1.57
Platform
Performance 7 8 10 8 8 8 7 8.0 1.00
Antiship Missile Combatants (Scenario #2)
Human
Performance 10 8 10 10 10 10 10 9.7 0.76
Platform
Performance 9 7 10 10 8 8 9 8.7 1.11
Torpedo-Firing Submarines (Scenario #1)
Factor Judges' • Scores Average Standard
Score Deviation
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
Human
Performance 8 6 9 10 9 5 7.8 1.94
Platform
Performance 8 6 9 10 8 9 8.3 1.37
Torpedo-Firing Submarines (Scenario #2)
Human
Performance 9 8 9 10 10 8 9.0 0.89
Platform
Performance 8 8 9 10 9 9 8.8 0.69
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potential of a specific nation's naval inventory. In crder
for the weightings to be applied in concert with the
platform and personnel scores, the scales had to be
transformed. Transformation of the scales for antiship
missile combatants {Tables VI and VII) , diesel submarines
(Table VIII) and personnel-related factors (Table XIII) was
necessary in part because the scales were based on differing
numbers of performance characteristics. Twelve factors were
included in the antiship missile combatant scores for
Scenario #1. Thirteen characteristics went into the
calculations of the antiship missile combatant scores for
Scenario #2. Eleven totally different characteristics
formed the basis for computations of utility scores for the
diesel submarines. The personnel-related factors obviously
were computed on a different base.
Transformation of ratio-level data is permitted so long
as the transformation coefficient is greater than zero and
the transformation takes the form of b (x) , where b is the
coefficient and (x) is the existing scale value. 110 The
coefficients used in the current transformations were
selected so that the value for the platform with the highest
score on each scale would equal twenty. The transformation




TRANSFORMED ANTISHIP MISSILE COMBATANT
UTILITY SCORES
Scenario #1
LA CCMBATTANTE III PTFG (4 EXOCET) 20.00
DARING DEGS (8 EXOCET) 19.95
PR-72 PTFG (4 OTOMAT) 19.79
LUTA DDGS (6 STYX) 19.73
LUPO DDGS (4 OTOMAT) 19.63
GOREYY DDGS (4 STYX) 19.66
LA COMBATTANTE II PTFG (4 EXOCET) 19.52
LEANDER DEGSP (4 EXOCET) 19.52
FLETCEEE DDGS (4 EXOCET) 19.31
36.2-METEE PTG (2 EXOCET) 19.31
ALMIRANTE WILLIAMS DDGSP (4 EXOCET) 19.26
LA C0M3A1TANTE II PTFG (4 HARPOON) 19.26
PR-72 PTFG (4 EXOCET) 19.26
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (4 EXOCET) 19.05
VOSPEE MK-10 DDGSP (4 EXOCET) 18.89
U.S. ECEG (4 HARPOON) 18.83
SUMNER DDGS (4 EXOCET) 18.78
LUPO DDGS (2 OTOMAT) 18.67
LA COMBATTANTE II PTFG (2 EXOCET) 18.51
OSA I/II PTFG (4 STYX) 18.41
ASHVILLE PGG (2 HARPOON) 18.4 1
RIGA CEGS (2 STYX) 18.36
WHITEY DDGS (2 STYX) 18.36
FLETCHER DDGS (2 HARPOON) 18.04




SPRUANCE DDGS (2 HARPOON) 17.19
ASHVILLE PGG (4 STANDARD) 17.03
KOMAR PTG (2 STYX) 16.71
FLETCEER DDGS (4 STANDARD) 16.66
RESHEE/SAAR IV PTFG (8 GABRIEL) 16.34
BATTLE DDGSP (4 STANDARD) 16.29
SUMNEB DDGS (4 STANDARD) 16.13
ASHVILLE PGG (2 STANDARD) 16.02
SAAR III PTG (6 GABRIEL) 15.76
GEARING DDGS (2 STANDARD) 15.65
RESHEE/SAAR IV PTEG (4 GABRIEL) 15.60
SAAR II PTG (5 GABRIEL) 15.49
LA CCMBAIIANTE II PTFG (5 GABRIEL) 15.44
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (5 GABRIEL) 14.96
FLETCHER DDGS (4 GABRIEL) 14.96
SUMNER DDGS (4 GABRIEL) 14.43
LURSEN 45-METER PTFG (3 GABRIEL) 14.38
VOSPEB MK-5 DDGS (4 SEAKILLER) 13.47
P-48 EGMGL (8 SS-12) 10.72




TRANSFORMED ANTISHIP MISSILE COMBATANT
UTILITY SCORES
Scenario #2
LA CCMBAITANTE III PTFG (4 EXOCET) 20.00
LA COMBA1TANTE II PTFG (4 EXOCET) 19.40
LA COMBAITANTE II PTFG (4 HARPOON) 19.40
ALMIHANTE WILLIAMS DDGSP (4 EXOCET) 19.08
LEANEER EEGSP (4 EXOCET) 18.92
LA CCMBAITANTE II PTFG (2 EXOCET) 18.80
DARING DEGS (8 EXOCET) 18.65
FLETCHER DDGS (4 EXOCET) 18.37
L'JRSEN 45-METER PTFG (4 EXOCET) 18.29
LUPO DDGS (4 OTOMAT) 18.29
GEARING DDGS (2 STANDARD) 18.21
FLETCHER DDGS (4 STANDARD) 17.97
ASHVILLE PGG (4 STANDARD) 17.89
SUMNER DDGS (4 EXOCET) 17.81
PR-72 PTFG (4 EXOCET) 17.77
FLETCHER DDGS (2 HARPOON) 17.77
ASHVILLE PGG (2 HARPOON) 17.69
LUPO EDGS (2 OTOMAT) 17.69
U.S. PCEG (4 HARPOON) 17.65
RESHEI/SAAR IV PTFG (8 GABRIEL) 17.53
SAAR III PTFG (6 GABRIEL) 17.49
GORDYY DDGS (4 STYX) 17.49
BATTLE DDGSP (4 STANDARD) 17.49




SUMNEB DDGS (4 STANDABD) 17.41
SAAB II PTG (5 GABBIEL) 17.37
ASEVI11E PGG (2 STANDABD) 16.89
BESHEF/SAAB IV PTFG (4 GABBIEL) 16.89
LOTA DDGS (6 STYX) 16.89
LA CCMEATTANTE II PTFG (5 GABBIEL) 16.77
36.2-METEB PTG (2 EXOCET) 16.57
VOSPEB HK-10 DDGS (4 EXOCET) 16.10
BIGA DEGS (2 STYX") 15.98
SPBUANCE DDGS (2 HASPOON) 15.94
OSA I/II PTFG (4 STYX) 15.78
VOSPEB 37-METEB PTFG (2 OTOMAT) 15.70
LOaSEN 45-METEB PTFG (5 GABBIEL) 15.66
FLE1CHEB DDGS (4 GABBIEL) 15.66
WHITBY DDGS (2 STYX) 15.50
LURSEN 45-METEB PTFG (3 GABBIEL) 15.22
SOMNEB DDGS (4 GABBIEL) 15.10
KOMAfi PTG (2 STYX) 14.90
VOSPEE HK-5 DEGS (4 SEAKILLEB) 13.31
EBAVE PTGL (8 SS-12) 8.61




TRANSFORMED TORPED- FIRING DIESEL SUBMARINE UTILITY
SCORES
Scenario #1 Scenario #2
GUPPY III SS 20.00 TYPE 206/500 SS 20.00
TANG SS 16.33 TYPE 209 SS 19.75
GUPPY IA SS 16.22 GUPPY IA SS 18.26
GUPPY IIA SS 16.02 OBERON SS 18.18
HAN SS (N) 15.98 AGOSTA SS 18.14
GUPPY II SS 15.78 HAN SS(N) 17.98
FOXTROT SS 15.42 GUPPY II SS 17.60
TYPE 209 SS 15.38 TANG SS 17.56
GOLF SSB 14.94 FOXTROT SS 17.44
IYPE 206/500 SS 14.90 GUPPY IIA SS 17.40
AGOSTA SS 14.86 GUPPY III SS 17.23
CBERON SS 14.78 MING SS 17.15
MING SS 14.38 GOLF SSB 17.07
BOMEO SS 13.86 DAPHNE SS 16.53
EAPHNE SS 13.82 ROMEO SS 15.99
WHISKEY SS 13.19 WHISKEY SS 14.38
T-CONVERSION SS 12.99 T-CONVERSION SS 13.02
EALAO SS 11.31 BALAO SS 11 .74




TRANSFORMED PERSONNEL-RELATED FACTOR SCORES
Country Score Country Sco
Israel 20.00 Iraq 5.67
China (PRC) 15.34 Peru 5.39
Iran 14.26 Saudi Arabia 5.03
South Africa 12.34 Venezuela 5.03
Egypt 12.28 Singapore 4.97
India 11.56 Vietnam 4.61
Korea (North) 10.54 Columbia 4.43
Turkey 10.06 Thailand 4.43
Greece 9.46 Malaysia 4. 31
Cuba 8.99 Libya 4. C7
Korea (South) 8.33 Algeria 3.83
Syria 8.33 Ecuador 3.65
Argentina 8.27 Uruguay 3.53
Taiwan 8.27 Morocco 3. 17
Brazil 8.03 Tunisia 2. 82
Chile 6.29 Brunei 2.04




contained in Table VI, for example, required that the
previous utility values be multiplied by a transformation
coefficient cf .053 to convert the score for the LA
COMBATTANTE III PTFG from 377 to 20. Each score on the same
scale was subsequently multiplied by the same coefficient to
complete the transformation and develop the scale displayed
in Table XV.
It is worth noting that this transformation does net
affect the natural origin and does not alter the
relationship between the scores for combatants measured on
the scale A simple example will prove this point. In Table
VI the scores ranged from the LA COMBATTANTE III PTFG's 377
to the BHAVE PTGL's 182. On the transformed scale the
respective utility scores were 20.00 and 9.66. On both
scales the score for BRAVE PTGL was equal to U8 percent of
the score for the LA COMBATTANTE III. The relationships
between the scores for other ships on the same scale were
similarly unaffected.
Similar transformations with the appropriate
coefficients were accomplished for the scales contained in
Tables XVI, XVII and XVIII. In each case the transformation
coefficient was arbitrarily selected to set the platform/
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country with the highest score equal to twenty.
Platform utility scores and personnel-related factors
were examined for utility independence, pairwise
preferential independence and pairwise marginality to
determine the correct combinatorial relationship. The same
concepts and rules apply which pertained to determining the
correct relationship for calculating platform utility in
Step 9. The questionnaires were constructed so as to treat
platform utility independent of personnel factors. The
country factor scores were similarly separated from
considerations of weapon system sophistication and
capability. The two independence tests and the choice
indifference situation addressed in pairwise marginality are
all present. The additive combinatorial relationship
applies when all three tests are met. 111 The score for a
sea denial platform in a particular nation's inventory was
determined by multiplying the factor weighting found in
Table XIV tiites the personnel factor score for that
particular country (Table XVIII) . The platform factor
weighting frcm Table XIV was similarly multiplied by the
appropriate transformed utility score. The two resultant




An example comparing three specific platforms will
display the procedure used to develop platform scores and
will compare demonstrated Third World capabilities with
scores derived through the technique just described. Many
observers might feel that the scores displayed in Table XVI
do not reflect the mastery the Israeli RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG
displayed during the October 1973 war. As demonstrated in
the previous section of this chapter, platform utility
scores only present one determinant of military capability.
Personnel-related factors play a major part in determining
the effectiveness of naval platforms. Israel is generally
recognized to have well-trained military personnel and the
capability tc utilize and maintain military equipment. This
ability is reflected in the high personnel factor score
assigned to Israel by the experts. Examining the platform
utility scores in isolation is misleading. A side-by-side
comparison of the Israeli RESHEF/SAAR IV and the OSA I PTFGs
of Israel's opponents set in the Scenario #2 war-at-sea
situation which include the personnel factor may be more
revealing.
a. Israeli RESHEF/SAAR IV PTFG:
(9.7) (20.00) + (8.7) (17.53) = 347
b. Egyptian OSA I PTFG:
(9.7) (12.28) + (8.7) (15.78) = 256
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c. Syrian OSA I PTFG:
(9.7) (8.33) + (8.7) (15.78) = 218
The scores show the Israeli RESHEF/SAAR IV to be 1.35 times
as effective within the war-at-sea scenario as the Egyptian
OSA PTFG and approximately 1.6 times as effective as the
Syrian OSA. While this is a static measure ''which does not
allow combat modeling or predicting outcomes of specific
engagements, it does appear to reflect the previously
demonstrated capabilities of the individual nations.
As was the case with the submarine utility scores
examined in Chapter V, quantification which corresponds to
subjective judgments of decision makers and analysts who
deal with the problem is essential to achieving their
acceptance of the measurement technique. Comparison of
MAOT-derived capability scores with the demonstrated
abilities of specific nations to successfully employ the
weapon systems is a highly visible test of validity.
Unfortunately, there are few instances where Third World
nations have demonstrated sea denial/interdiction
capabilities. Thus, it is extremely important for the MAOT
technique to meet the few validity checks which are
available. In the case of the submarine developments
enunciated in Chapter V and the brief assessment of the
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Arab-Israeli comparison MAUT has met the validity test
D. DEVELOPING NATIONAL SEA DENIAL INDEXES
Combining sea denial capability scores for antiship
missile combatants
.
and diesel submarines involves comparing
"apples and oranges" to the extent that dissimilar systems
are involved. However, there is a common threat posed by
the two types of systems which promotes their combination
into a common index. CDR Eldridge dealt with the problem of
combining firepower indexes by multiplying submarine
firepower scores by a factor of 1.2 before combining
submarine scores with the scores for the antiship missile
combatants. The 1.2 factor was an intuitive score designed
"...to account for the increased complexity of the...
defensive problem" 112 presented by submerged platforms.
Gathering expert opinion about the weighting to apfly to
either the submarine or the missile combatant threat
presents an alternative to simple intuitive reasoning. Ten
D.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officers at the Naval Postgraduate
School were asked to place themselves in the position of tne
Captain of the merchant ship/tanker or Commanding Officer of
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the surface combatants under attack in the scenarios
outlined in the sea denial questionnaires (Appendix B and
C) . Each was asked to assign a value ranging from zerc to
ten to the threat posed by an antiship missile combatant or
a diesel submarine in each scenario. Again zero was defined
as the point at which the attacker posed no threat. The
average score assigned to both the missile combatant and the
diesel submarine in the Scenario #1 attack upon a merchant
ship/tanker was 8.6. When placed in the position of the
Commanding Officer of the surface combatant in the Scenario
#2 combat situations, the judges assigned a score of 6.3 to
the typical missile ship and an average score of 5.8 tc the
diesel submarine threat. The fact that the experts
evaluated the two threats as being of approximately equal
magnitude removed the requirement to weight either factor in
developing overall capability scores. (No attempt will be
made to compare capability scores from Scenario #1 to
Scenario #2.)
The development of aggregate sea denial capability
scores for each of the Third World nations demonstrates the
flexibility inherent in MAUT-derived judgments of military
worth. It also presents information which might be
requested by a decision maker. It provides a meaningful
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index of the naval balance within a particular geographical
area. It also would assist a policy maker faced with the
difficult decisions which accompany requests for security
assistance to meet a perceived threat from a neighboring
nation. A number of additional uses for such an index might
be envisioned. Suffice it to say Jthat an index of this type
is in keeping with the demands which might be placed on a
researcher by a decision maker.
An overall sea denial/interdiction score requires an
up-to-date naval order-of-battle listing such as the one
contained in Appendix A. Utility scores for a particular
weapon platform are combined with the personnel-related
factor sccre as demonstrated in the previous section of this
chapter. The resultant score is multiplied by the number of
platforms of that type contained in the nation's naval
inventory. Scores for particular types of weapon systems
are summed to develop aggregate sea denial scores for each
nation in turn. (Table XIX presents the scores for Scenario
#1 and Table XX displays similar scores for Scenario #2.)
The two tables present the decision maker with a large
amcunt of information about the sea denial/interdiction




NATIONAL SEA DENIAL CAPABILITY SCORES
Scenario #1
Country Missile Diesel Total Future
Combatant Submarine (1976) (1980)
Score Score Score Score
Eastern Mediterranean:
Greece 1938 1252 3190 3794
Turkey 250+ 2939 3189+ 4428 +
Central and Southi America:
Argentina 778 778 2818 +
Brazil 1610 1610 2426
Chile 844 343 1187 1187
Columbia 324 324 324
Cuba 4982 4982 4982*
Ecuador 555 555 867
Peru 415 1200 1615 2743
Uruguay 310
Venezuela 640 558 1198 2578
North Africa and Middle East:
Algeria 1551 1551 1551
Egypt 4212 2783 6995 6995
Iran 1707 1707 6377
Iraq 1995 1995 1995*
Israel 5491 264 5755 8446
Libya 341 160 501 7607
Morocco 182 182 1776
Saudi Aratia +
Syria 2576 2576 2576*
Tunisia 333 333 333
Sub-Saharan Africa
:




Country Missile Diesel Total Future
Combatant Submarine (1976) (1980)
Score Score Score Score
Senegal 198 198 297
Somalia 599 599 599*
South Africa 634 634 2483 +
South Asia;
India 2001 1745 3746 4182 +
Pakistan 486 486 486
East and Southeast Asia:
Brunei 95 95 95
China (PEC) 36711 14002 50713 51829
Indonesia 2250 470 2720 2720
Korea (North) 4204 2542 6746 6746*
Korea (South) 420 + 420 + 630 +
Malaysia 1209 1209 1955 +
Singapore 1007 1007 1007
Taiwan 189 391 580 580 +
Thailand 309 309 618
Vietnam 349 349 349
+ Additional units on order or in the current inventory.
Lack of detailed information concerning numbers of units
and/or performance characteristics precludes determining
capability scores.
* Denotes nations which rely on the USSR and/or other
Communist nations for naval weapons. Future unannounced





NATIONAL SEA DENIAL CAPABILITY SCORES
Scenario #2








Greece 2105 1511 3616 4393
Turkey 272+ 3297 3569+ 4869+
Central and Sout h America:
Argentina 960 960 3109+
Brazil 1816 1816 2717
Chile 905 433 1338 1338
Columbia 428 428 428
Cuba 5025 5025 5025*
Ecuador 584 584 997
Peru 429 1394 1823 3093
Uruguay 411
Venezuela 768 556 1324 2790







































Senegal 174 174 261
Somalia 583 583 583*
South Africa 770 770 2914 +
South Asia:
India 1993 2111 4104 4632 +
Pakistan 600 600 600
East and Southeast Asia:
Brunei 95 95 95
China (PRC) 37409 16466 53875 55051
Indonesia 2205 543 2748 2748
Korea (North) 4235 3006 7241 7241*
Korea (South) 473 + 473 + 709 +
Malaysia 1288 1288 2109 +
Singapore 1165 1165 1165
Taiwan 212 459 671 671 +
Thailand 351 351 702
Vietnam 349 349 349
+ Additional units on order or in the current inventory.
Lack of detailed information concerning numbers of units
and/or performance characteristics precludes determining
capability scores.
* Denotes nations which rely on the USSR and/or other
Communist nations for naval weapons. Future unannounced




situation with respect to missile-carrying surface
combatants and torpedo-firing diesel submarines. The third
column gives aggregate capability scores. The fourth column
displays the aggregate capability scores for each nation
assuming the delivery of all systems currently contracted for
and no retirement of existing systems. The tables have the
advantages of being concise, easily interpreted and quickly
updated as information concerning inventory changes becomes
available. They present the decision maker with capability
scores, rather than the relatively unsophisticated outputs of
techniques displayed in Chapter III. They incorporate the
capabilities which are inherent in the weapons platforms and
take into account the ability of the recipient nation to
effectively utilize the weapons. No other technique
discovered to date has the ability to combine this number of
complex factors into a sophisticated, yet easily understood,
format. These advantages cannot be overstressed in an era of
extreme demands on decision makers* time and the resultant
reliance on meaningful research.
E. THE MIDELE EAST CRISIS SCENARIO
What insights can be gained by application of the scores
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to the 1980 crisis scenario postulated in Chapter I? MAUT
focuses attention on a number of factors highlighted in that
scenario. The implications which can be drawn will be
demonstrated by taking each nation involved in that scenario
in turn.
1. Kuwait: Kuwait has neither antiship missile
combatants, nor diesel submarines. However, acquisition of
antiship missile combatants is expected in the near future.
Scores derived in this thesis suggest that Kuwait's best
counter to the Iragi naval build-up would be to purchase high
capability ships such as the LA COMBATTANTE III PTFG with the
EXCCET SSft to exploit the deficiencies of the OSA PTFGs in
the Iragi inventory (Table XVI) and to exploit the relatively
low Iraqi personnel-related factors (Table XVIII) by
developing or hiring a highly trained cadre of personnel.
2. Saudi Arabia: The judges considered the Saudis about
equal to the Iraqis in the personnel-related areas (Table
XVIII) . Thus, relative capabilities become dependent en the
numbers and nilitary worth of the ships in each nation's
inventory. The absence of information about the numbers and
performance characteristics of the missile combatants to be
provided as part of the Saudi Naval Expansion Program package
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precludes further evaluation of the possible impact of the
Saudi decision to support Kuwait in the hypothetical crisis
situation.
3. Iraq: The platform capability scores in Table XV and
XVI reveal that further Soviet deliveries of OSA PTFGs might
be required in order for Iraq to retain a position of
dominance over combined Kuwaiti and Saudi forces, especially
if Kuwait were to acquire ships of the LA CCMBATTANTE III
PTFG caliter. The relatively poor score for the OSA PTFG in
the war-at-sea situation, coupled with the unimpressive
personnel-related score for Iraq, means that the Soviets
would have tc resupply Iraq with more than one OSA PTFG for
each LA CCMfiATTANTE III PTFG introduced into the Kuwaiti
inventory in order to maintain Iraqi superiority. An
alternative would be to improve training and logistics
support to raise Iraq's personnel-related score.
4. Iran: tfhile Iraq and Iran are roughly equivalent in
sea denial capabilities at the present time (Table XIX and
XX) , the Shah will clearly have the dominant navy in the
Persian Gulf by 1980. This is a result of both the influx of
significant numbers of very capable weapon platforms and the
nigh perscnnel-related score assigned to Iran by the judges.
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A force with these considerable capabilities operating in the
confines cf the Persian Gulf as described in the crisis
scenario will be formidable.
5. Libya: Libyan sea denial capabilities are among the
lowest in the Middle East at the present time. However, the
influx of capable weapon platforms such as the PR-72 PTFG
{Tables XV and XVI) will give President Qadhaafi one of the
dominant Third World navies by 1980. If the rather dismal
personnel-related score (Table XVIII) could be improved in
the interim, Libyan capabilities could be expanded even
further.
6. Egypt: It is realistic to assume that Egypt views
the growing Libyan naval capabilities with concern. While
Egypt is clearly dominant at present (Table XIX and XV) , she
may well be surpassed by Libya in the near future. The
possibility that Egyptian units might have to be retired or
scrapped for spare parts in the interim period further
aggravates the Egyptian situation. The relatively high score
for personnel-related factors indicates that an effort to
improve Egyptian naval capabilities will have to concentrate
on inventory augmentation with units comparable to the
guality of the units being acquired by Libya. In short, by
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1980 Egypt might be expected to call for outside support in
the face of a Libyan blockade as was postulated in the
hypothetical crisis scenario.
7. Israel: The overall capability scores show Israel to
be roughly equivalent to Egypt as the dominant navy in the
Eastern Mediterranean at present. This is clearly the case
of meeting Egyptian quantity with Israeli quality as
demonstrated by the scores. The orders which have been place
for additional antiship missile and submarine platforms and
the high guality personnel and support functions will improve
Israel's relative position in the near future making her the
single dominant naval force in the Eastern Mediterranean.
What cf the concerns of the major naval powers over the
threat of guerrilla-type attacks on Western shipping? The
quantification of sea interdiction capabilities indicates
that the concerns are legitimate and that the threat is
growing. For example, in the foreseeable future the sea
interdiction potential of nations cast in the scenario as
being in opposition to the West will increase as follows
(from Table XX) :
1. Iran Up 400 percent over 1977 level.
2. Libya Op 1500 percent over 1977 level.
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Other significant, if less spectacular, increases will occur





This study has demonstrated a potential problem for
Western nations who are dependent on sea lines of
communication for supplies of vital resources. Third World
navies are rapidly enlarging their sea interdiction
capabilities and their capacity for limited-area sea denial.
The increased capabilities are primarily embodied in
large-scale acquisitions of antiship missile combatants and
torpedo-firing diesel submarines. The magnitude of these
acquisitions alone requires that the threat and the potential
foreign policy implications which attend transfers of these
systems be closely examined.
A survey of previous attempts to measure military
capabilities reveals a need for improved analytic techniques.
Arms transfer analysis in general requires meaningful inquiry
into the military capabilities which are being transferred to
Third World nations. Meaningful analysis is particularly
important to evaluation of Third World naval capabilities
because of the direct threat to Western interests which these
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capabilities can pose. The immediacy of the threat has
generated an urgent requirement for analytical techniques
which can transcend inventory counting or dcllar expenditure
evaluations to analyze military capabilities.
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory as developed in the LeGrow
thesis offers a technique for meaningful quantification of
military capabilities. The theory behind the technique is
sound. It produces ratio-level data which increases its
usefulness and avoids the computational abuses which often
accompany the use of interval-level data. The application of
MAUT to the sea denial capabilities question resulted in
three majcr findings.
1. MAUT is a workable technique. MAUT and the Constant
Sum Method are both amenable to treatment in questionnaires.
The required computations are easily explained and can be
performed on a hand-held calculator. The two techniques
operating in concert permit the incorporation of a wide range
of expertise into the study. The results obtained are
consistent with observed real-world phenomena.
2 MAUT is well suited to asses smen ts of Military
capabilities. MAUT/ augmented by the Constant Sum Method,
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permits a comprehensive examination of the multi-faceted
problem of quantifying military capabilities. It measures
capabilities directly, rather than relying on surrogate
measures such as weapon system cost. MAUT and the Constant
Sum Method offer an optimal trade-off between realism and
sophistication. They incorporate measurements of the
important determinants of weapon system capabilities tc
present a realistic appraisal of military worth. In this
regard they offer greater sophistication than current
methods, tut do not become encumbered in the complexities of
computer programs and higher mathematics as do sophisticated
combat models. Finally, the method has the flexibility
required for imaginative application in the area of arms
transfer analysis.
3. MAUT offer s a meaningful po-licy- mak inq tool . The
technique described in this thesis can aid in bridging the
chasm which cften exists between the analyst immersed in the
intricacies of a problem and the decision maker who remains a
generalist. MAUT offers expert judgments presented in an
easily understood format. The output is concise. Its
flexibility permits tailoring the technique to answer the
policy maker's specific questions. MAUT outputs can serve as
excellent rules-cf-thumb for a decision maker lacking the
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The focus of this thesis has been on a thorougn
examination of the MAUT technique, rather than on sutstantive
analysis. However, the presence of the real and growing
potential threat from lesser developed nations' navies
requires that major substantive findings be brought to the
reader's attention.
1 . Current analysis tends to understate the £Ot en t ial se a
interdiction threat. Figures presented in Chapter II showed
that Third World antiship missile combatant inventories will
expand approximately 66 percent between 1977 and 1980.
Inventories of diesel submarines will increase by
approximately 33 percent over the same period. MAUT-derived
scores taken from Table XIX and XX demonstrate that
capabilities will increase in excess of 85 percent during
that time period. Moreover, this dramatic increase is
tremendously understated. It does not include Soviet^bloc
transfers which might occur during the period. Non-Communist
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transfers have been omitted where detailed information is
lacking. But, more significantly, the 85 percent increase is
based on present personnel-related factor scores. It is
anticipated that additional training and operational
experience obtained during the three-year period will add
significantly to the 1980 capability scores.
2. Concentrations of sea denial capabil itie s have
occurred/are evolv ing in specific geographical regions. Much
of this concentration has taken place in areas which are
particularly vital to Western interests. The Eastern
Mediterranean is a case in point. In North Africa, the
anticipated ten-fold increase in Moroccan capabilities and
Libya's dramatic 1500 percent expansion may have profound
implications for naval planners. Further, Libyan and
Moroccan plans may spur increased acquisitions by neighboring
Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt which will raise the concentration
of naval capabilities in this area. Other areas of interest
which evolve from MAUT analysis are South Africa, the Persian
Gulf and the nations surrounding the Straits of Malacca. All
have/will have dense concentrations of sea denial
capabilities in restricted ocean areas.
3- Transfers of technology greatly, affect sea denial
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capabilities. The MAUT technique clearly demonstrates the
significant impact which technology transfers have on sea
denial potential. Transfers of ECM/DECM eguipment,
deliveries cf sophisticated torpedoes and incorporation of
antiship nissile defenses can rapidly upgrade existing
systems. Decisions to deliver follow-on missiles like the
improved EXOCET could alter regional naval balances. The
implications of technology transfers are dramatic because of
the speed with which changes can occur. Lead time on
delivery cf new surface combatants and submarines could be
five to seven years. Transfers of technology can occur
within a matter of weeks or months.
4. Personnel and societal infl uen ces are often ignored.
The judges rated personnel considerations approximately equal
to weapon performance in determining the sea denial potential
cf lesser developed nations. Arms transfer analysis tends to
overlook personnel and societal influences. In doing so it
ignores extrenely important factors.
MAUT analysis displayed two distinct groups of nations.
The first grouping has largely realized its potential in
personnel-related fields. This group is epitomized by
Israel, South Africa and the PRC. These nations must
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concentrate efforts to increase sea denial potential in the
weapons acquisition/improvement areas. Each is currently
pursuing this course of action.
The second group encompasses nations with potential which
has not teen realized because of low personnel-related
scores. This group would be expected to attempt to increase
sea denial potential by upgrading training, maintenance and
logistics functions. The relative speed with which benefits
can be realized, compared with the length of time required to
acguire additional weapon systems, requires close examination
of personnel-related factors.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOE FURTHER STUDY
Further study of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory is
clearly warranted. Three areas of investigation are
suggested.
1 • £§£§ii^i research. Duplicate research in the area of
sea denial capabilities is reguired to examine the
reliability cf the capability scores presented in this
thesis. Sensitivity analysis should be accomplished to
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determine whether the results were biased by the chcice of
experts or by the questionnaires utilized in the study.
2. Expansion of MAUT . MAUT should be expanded into
additional areas of military capability analysis. Studies of
other missicr.s and scenarios are warranted. Investigation of
additional missions and scenarios will further develop the
mechanics of the technique.
3. Utilize results for substantive anal ysis . The study
of sea denial capabilities suggests applications for MAUT in
analysis cf arms racing. Application of MAUT capability
scores to sinulations and projection techniques might be
explored. Study of the interaction of geography and naval
capabilities is is also required. For example, the PRC's
tremendous naval capability score is significantly tempered
by requirements placed on its navy by a long coastline and
widely separated operating areas. A smaller concentration of
sea denial capabilities in restricted waters such as the
Straits cf Malacca may prove to be far more significant.
Updated personnel-related factor scores, coupled with
current platform capability scores for a wide variety cf
platforms and scenarios, would provide the basis for
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responsive and meaningful research. MAUT has the ability to
meet a decision maker's needs in quantifying military worth.
The development of the necessary MAUT-derived scores and an
in-depth exploration of potential applications of the
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ANTISHIP MISSILE COMBATANT QUESTIONNAIRE
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
From: Curricular Officer, Naval Intelligence Curriculum (Code-33)
To:
Subj: Student Questionnaire; distribution of
End: (1) Sea Denial Capabilities Questionnaire
1. Enclosure 1 represents one part of a student research project
currently underway ac the Naval Postgraduate School which is designed
to measure the military worth of small, missile-equipped surface
combatants. Results of this questionnaire will be incorporated into
a thesis being prepared by LT Lowell 3. Jacoby as a degree require-
ment in the Naval Intelligence Curriculum.
2. Distribution of this questionnaire has been greatly constrained
by the lack of personnel within the U.S. Navy structure with
expertise in the area of anti-ship missile capabilities and/or
experience with small combatants of the ^ype being employed by
lesser developed nations a3 anti-ship missile platforms. Thus,
each response to this questionnaire becomes very important to this
research effort.
3. Questionnaire results should be returned to LT Jacoby via the
pre-addressed envelope enclosed. Given "he time constraints
imposed by a March 1977 graduation date, completion of the question-
naire at your earliest convenience would greatly aid the research.





SEA DENIAL CAPABILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE
The proliferation of sophisticated anti-ship missile systems
and modern small combatant platforms for these systems has caused
increasing concern among naval planners. The demand for these
relatively inexpensive weapons systems and the ability of lesser
developed nations to effectively employ these platforms is likely
to expand. The naval threat from lesser developed nations is likely
to expand accordingly.
Research being conducted by LT Lowell E. Jacoby at the Naval
Fostgraduate School is attempting to evaluate the military worth of
these weapons systems in order to better identify the threat that
these systems pose. In this questionnaire you will be asked to
evaluate various performance characteristics of surface-to-surface
missiles and/or small surface combatants which typically are as-
sociated with these missiles in lesser developed nations' navies.
The results from this questionnaire will provide an important input
for an evaluation of the military capabilities of these modem
naval systems.
Scenarios
Two scenarios are of particular concern in considering the
implications of the transfer of anti-ship missiles and small surface
combatants to lesser developed nations. Scenario £l involves the
possibility of guerrilla-type operations against merchant ships/
tankers or surprise attacks against isolated surface combatants.
Inherent in this scenario is the requirement that the missile plat-
form transit to normal sea lanes/open ocean operating areas to con-
duct the attack. It is assumed that the attack would occur at the
time and place of the missile boat commander's choice in conditions
most favorable to the missile platform, and that the engagement
would occur out of range of land or 3ea-based air cover.
The other scenario ( Scenario =2 ) concerns the possibility of
missile platform vs missile platform war-at-sea between two or more
lesser developed nations. This scenario matches the platforms in
one-on-one engagements and assumes that neither opponent would have




occurred during the 1970 Indo- Pakistani War and naval battles fought
during the 1973 October War in the Middle Sast.
Example
The methodology being utilized in this research is termed
"Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUD". MAUT requires the develop-
ment of utility curves which serve as standards against which real-
world systems can be judged. 'The following utility curve drawn
from a study of air combat capabilities will serve as an illustration
of the technique.







1 .0 1 ' 2 1.5 1.'3 2\0^
Maximum Combac Mach Number
Interpretation: Judges evaluating Maximum Combat Mach Number
indicate that a fighter's utility is minimal below a maximum Mach
number of 1.2 and that utility increases steadily between Mach num-
bers of 1.2 and 1.3. Ac Mach 1.3 speed is optimal (represented by
a score of 10) and utility decreases at speeds in excess of Mach 1.3,
C-iven "his curve, an aircraft with a maximum Mach number of 1.3 is
twice as useful as a fighter as one with a 1 .2 maximum. Also, an
aircraft with a maximum combat Mach number of 1.5 would have a





You are asked to answer questions and sketch utility curves
for the following, characteristics associated with naval surface-to-
surface missile systems or naval missile platforms. If you do not
feel qualified to judge a particular characteristic, it should not
preclude you from answering other questions, since each is considered
to be independent of all other questions. In each case a utility
3core of zero represents the minimum for a particular characteristic
necessary for successful performance of the mission outlined in
each scenario. (Example: The judges felt that below 1.3 Mach an
aircraft does not have sufficient speed to successfully perform the
air combat mission.) A utility 3core of ten represents the upper
limit; ie. what you judge to be technologically feasible or desirable,
to perform the mission outlined in each scenario. (Example: 1.3
Mach represents the 3peed the judges felt was mo3t desirable in an
air combat environment.) At the end of the Questionnaire you are
asked to weight those factors which you judged. It should bo
emphasized that you are being asked for subjective judgSBB&S: based
on your experience at all times in filling out this questionnaire.
1 . What designated r-.aximum platform soeed is most desirable (Utility
score of ten) for a naval missile platform performing the mission
outlined in Scenario #1 ; Scenario ?2 ? What is the
lowest designated maxim-am platform speed (Utility of zero) required
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2. Given the necessary trade-offs between platform size, fuel
capacity, fuel consumption at maximum speed vs fuel consumption at
economical speed, etc., what range at maximum sustained speed is
most desirable (Utility score of ten) for a mi3sile platform per-
forming the mission outlined in Scenario rf1 ; Scenario ?2
1 What is the least range at maximum sustained speed
(Utility score of zero) required for successful performance of the
Scenario #1 mission ; Scenario $2 nission ? Please
sketch the two curves in the spaces below.
Range at Maximum Sustained Speed











500 1 500 2500KM
Max Range at Sustained
Soeed
500 1500 2500NM
Max Range at Sustained
Soeed
3. Many of the lesser developed nations face money constraints in
purchasing naval missile platforms. This makes the cose per unit and
considerations of the number of units which are desira'cle given zhs
flexibility/survivability which accompanies larger numbers of units
of prime concern in purchasing decisions. Given these considerations
and the trade-offs which exist between stability, detectability,
space for sensors and weapons systems, etc., what standard dis-
placement is most desirable (Utility score of ten) for missile
platforms performing the mission outlined in Scenario £1 ;
Scenario #2 ? What is the minimum standard displacement
required (Utility score of zero) for missile platforms performing




Please sketch the two curves for standard displacement in the
spaces provided below.
Standard Disolacement












, 1;00 [ 2500 Tor.
3
Standard Disolacement
L. Oiven the fact that most of the missile platforms under con-
sideration are limited in internal 3pace and heigh!: of tallest mast,
what is the maximum radar acquisition ran^e (Utility of ten) which
is desirable/technologically feasible for platforms operating
against merchant ship/tanker-size targets in Scenario fh missions
; against missile patrol boat-size targets in Scenario =2
? What is the shortest maximum radar acquisition range
(Utility score of zero) possible which will permit successful ac-
complishment of the mission outlined in Scenario #1 (mer-
chant 3hip/tanker-size target); Scenario #2 (missile patrol
boat-size target)? Please sketch the two curves in the spaces below,


















5. Given trade-offs involving limited space and desire for addi-
tional weapons systems, etc., what utility scores would you attach
to the following SCM capabilities for platforms involved in missions
outlined in the two scenarios (Utility scores range from a high of




A- Chaff plus broad-band jammer
Chaff plus spot jammer
3road-band and spot jammer
_______
Chaff, broad-band and spot jammers
6. As was noted -in Question 3, there are a number of factors which
tend to limit the 3ize of missile platforms operated by lesser
developed nations. Given space limitations and the fact that in-
cluding anti-ship missile defense weapons might require the removal
of some 3urface-to-surface missile launchers, what utility scores
would you attach to the following anti-s'hio missile defense systems
for platforms involved in missions outlined in Scenario #2? (Utility
scores range from a high of ten to a low of zero.) Score
a. AAA gun (23mm to 30mm range)
Catling gun
Point defense 3AH system
AAA gun and point defense SAM system
Catling gun and point defense SAM system
AAA gun and Catling gun
AAA gun, Catling gun and point defense SAM system
_____
7. Realizing that there are 3ize, weight, warhead size, guidance
considerations, etc., what is the maximum effective
_______
of the
missile (Utility of ten) which is most desirable/technologically
feasible for the performance of the Scenario ;jh mission
;
the Scenario t2 mission ? What is the lowest maximum ef-
fective range of the missile which would permit successful completion
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of the mission outlined in Scenario #1 ; outlined in
Scenario #2 ? Please sketch the two curves in the spaces
below.
Maximum Sffective Range of the Missile








10 "5CNM ~7o Ic 30" !I3 ?osm
Max. Effective Ranae
3. Given the trade-offs between penetration capability, missile
range, warhead size, etc., what missile soeed is most: desirable/
technologically feasible (Utility score of ten) for a r.aval missile
performing the mission outlined in Scenario #1 ; outlined
in Scenario t2 ? What is the minimum missile speed re-
quired (Utility of zero) for successful execution of the Scenario x1
mission ; Scenario #2 ? Please sketch the two

























9. Given trade-offs between missile size, range, weight, etc.,
what is the maximum warhead size desirable/technologically feasible
(Utility of ten) for a naval missile performing Scenario #1 missions
; Scenario £2 missions ? What is the minimum war-
head size which will allow successful completion (Utility of zero)
of the mission outlined in Scenario #1 ; Scenario #2 ?
Please sketch the two curves in the spaces below.
Warhead Size





125 250 375 500 625Lbs.
Warhead Size
TTs 2?3 J7"5 5o"o 625Lbs
.
Warhead Size
10. The maximum missile hit probability which is desirable/tech-
nologically feasible is clearly one. What is the minimum missile
hie probability which you feel is acceptable in performing the mission
outlined in Scenario ^ ? Ignoring the problem of probability
of penetration, what; is the minimum missile probability acceptable
in performing the mission outlined in Scenario #2
sketch the two curves in the spaces below. (Utility of ten is as-





















11. Given the trade-offs with size, hit probability, etc., and the
desirability to launch multiple missiles 'in certain scenarios, plus
limitations imposed by the missile control mechanisms, what is the
optimal number of missile tubes (Utility of ten) to have on the
launch platform to perform the mission outlined in Scenario #1
; Scenario. #2 ? What is the minimum number of mis-
sile tubes required for successful completion of the Scenario #1
missi-on ; Scenario w2. mission ? Please sketch the
utility curves in the spaces below.
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Ll B 12 16Number of Tubes
20 Tube
3
12. What utility scores would you attach to the following missile
guidance ; ys terns given the requirenents of the missions outlined in




a. Inertial with active radar
terminal guidance
b. Autopilot with active radar
terminal guidance
c. Command with active radar
terminal guidance
d. Command with semi-active radar
terminal guidance
a. Seam rider









13- What utility score would you assign (Utility scores range, from
a maximum of ten to a minimum of zero) to a missile with a home -or.
-
jam capability given Scenario #1 ; given Scenario #2
1!+. What utility scores would you assign to the following fuzing
cor.f idurations given the requirements of the missions outlined in
the two scenarios? (Utility scores range from a maximum of ten to
a ninimum of zero.) Scenario r1 Scenario ?2
a. Contact fuze
b. Contact with delay
c. Proximity fuze
15« With the wide variety of performance characteristics covered
in this questionnaire, it is probable that not all of the character-
istics contribute equally to mission success. In the spaces below
indicate the weighting factor which should be applied to each
characteristic based on that characteristic's contribution to suc-
cessful completion of the missions outlined in the two scenarios.
If you feel that two or more characteristics are equally important
to successful completion, they should be assigned the same weighting
factor, '.v'eightings range from zero, which means that the factor
r.akes no contribution to successful mission completion, to ten, which
means that the characteristic plays an essential role in successful
completion of the mission outlined. Please weight only those factors
which you judged in the previous sections of the questionnaire.
Scenario #1 Scenario #2
1
.
Designated maximum platform speed





3. Standard platform displacement
L|.. Maximum radar acquisition range
5. Platform SCM capabilities
6. 'Anti-ship missile defense systems




10. Missile hit probability
11. dumber of missile tubes
12. Type of missile guidance system
13. Home-or.-jam capability
Ml. Fuzing configuration
Scenario #1 Scenario #2
16. A lesser developed nation's capacity to provide qualified
crews and to maintain the weapons systems is of concern in attempting
to evaluate the military worth of the anti-ship missile systems and
modern small combatant platforms found in their inventory. Please
provide your evaluation of the relative importance of the human
factors and the platform performance characteristics of these
systems in performing the missions outlined in the two scenarios.
Scores range from a high of ten to a low of zero. Ten indicates that
the factor is all important to mission success. A score of zero
indicates that the factor has no importance in performing the mis-
sion successfully. Duplicate scores can be awarded if you feel that
the two factors have eauai imoortar.ee.
Scenario #1 Scenario f2
Human factors— capability to man,
maintain and operate the
overall weapons system.
Performance factors--overall per-
formance capabilities of the
weapons system.
Any comments which you would like to include on the back of
this page would be greatly appreciated. Again, thank you very much




TORPEDO-FIRING DIESEL SUBMARINE QUESTIONNAIRE
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
From: Curricular Officer, Naval Intelligence Curriculum (Code-33)
To:
Subj: Student Questionnaire; distribution of
2nd: (1) Diesel Submarine Capabilities Questionnaire
1
.
Enclosure 1 represents one part of a student research project
currently underway at the Naval Postgraduate School designed to
measure the military worth of torpedo-firing diesel submarines
found in the inventories of various lesser developed nations.
Results of this questionnaire will be incorporated into a thesis
being prepared by LT Lowell Z. Jacoby as a degree requirement in
the Naval Intelligence Curriculum.
2. Distribution of this questionnaire has been greatly constrained
by the shortage of personnel within the U.S. Navy structure with
analytical expertise and/or recent operational experience with
diesel submarines. Thus, each response to thi3 questionnaire be-
comes very important to this research effort.
3. Questionnaire results should be returned to LT Jaccby via the
pre-addressed envelope enclosed. C-iven the time constraints
imposed by a March 197? graduation date, completion of the question-
naire at your earliest convenience would greatly aid the research
project
.
I4.. Tour participation in this research project would be most
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DJSSEL SUBMARINE CAPABILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE
The increase in the numbers of diesel submarines in lesser
developed nations' inventories and the increase in numbers of nations
possessing torpedo-firing diesel submarines in recent years has
caused increasing concern among naval planners. The demand for
submarines and the ability of lesser developed nations to effectively
employ these platforms is likely to expand. The naval threat from
lesser developed nations is likely to expand accordingly.
Research being conducted by LI Lowell E. Jacoby at the Naval
Postgraduate School is attempting to evaluate the military worth of
these weapons systems in order to better identify the threat that
these systems pose. In this questionnaire you will be asked to
evaluate various performance characteristics of torpedo-firing
diesel submarines. The results from this questionnaire will provide
an important input for an evaluation of the military capabilities
of these naval weapons systems.
Scenarios
Two scenarios are of particular concern in considering the
implications of the transfer of torpedo-firing diesel submarines to
lesser developed nations. Scenario rl involves the possibility of
guerrilla-type operations against merchant ships/tankers or sur-
prise attacks against isolated surface combatants. Inherent in this
scenario is the requirement that the attacking submarine transit to
normal sea lanes to conduct the attack. It is assumed that the
attack would occur at the time and place of the submarine commander's
choice in conditions most favorable to the attacking unit, and that
the entire attack phase of the scenario would occur out of range of
land or sea-based surveillance and/or ASW aircraft.
The other scenario (Scenario ?2 ) concerns the possibility that
diesel submarines would be U3ed in a war-at-sea between two or more
lesser developed nations. It is assumed that the submarines would
be employed against the other nation's surface combatants in this
circumstance. These ships generally have a limited ASW capability.




threat posed by the adversary, but are unable to call upon sea or
land-based air support.
Example
The methodology being utilized in this research is termed
"Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)." MAUT requires the develop-
ment of utility curves which serve as standards against which real-
world systems can be judged. The following utility curve drawn
from a study of air combat capabilities will serve as an illustration
of che technique.






Maximum Combat Mach Sunt
T.5
Interpretation: Judges evaluating Maximum Combat Mach Number
indicate that a fighter's utility is minimal below a maximum Mach
number of 1
.2 and that utility increases steadily between Mach num-
bers of 1.2 and 1.8. At Mach 1.3 speed is optimal (represented by
a score of 10) and utility decreases at speeds in excess of Mach 1.8,
C-iven this curve, an aircraft with a maximum Mach number of 1.5 is
twice as useful as a fighter as one with a 1.2 maximum. Also, an
aircraft with a maximum combat Mach number of 1.5 would have a





You are asked to answer questions and sketch utility curves
for the following characteristics associated with naval surface-to-
surface missile systems or naval missile platforms. If you do not
feel qualified to judge a particular characteristic, it should not
preclude you from answering other questions, since each is considered
to be independent of all other questions. In each case a utility
score of zero represents the minimum for a particular characteristic
necessary for successful performance of the mission outlined in
each scenario. (Example: The judges felt chat belcw 1.0 Mach an
aircraft does not have sufficient speed tc successfully perform the
air corneal; mission.) A utility score of ten represents the upper
limit; ie. what you judge tc be technologically feasible or desirable,
to perform the mission outlined in each scenario. (Example: 1.3
Mach represents the speed the judges felt was most desirable in an
air combat environment.) At the end of the questionnaire you are
asked to weight those factors which you judged. It should be
emphasized that you are being asked for subjective judgments based
on your experience at all times in filling out -his questionnaire.
1 . Many of the lesser developed nations face money constraints in
purchasing submarines. This makes cost per unit and considerations
concerning the number of units which are desirable given the in-
creased flexibility/survivability which accompanies larger numbers
of unita of prime concern in purchasing decisions. Given these
trade-offs, what submerged displacement is most desirable (Utility
of ten) for a submarine performing the mission outlined in Scenario
ih : Scenario ~Z ? What is the minimum submerged
displacement required (Utility of zero) for submarines to success-
fully perform the Scenario #1 mission ; the Scenario #2
mission ? Please sketch the two curves in the spaces pro-
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Submersed Disolacement
2. What maximum submerged speed is most desirable (utility score
of ten) for a submarine performing the mission outlined in Scenario
r?1 ; Scenario r=2 ? What is the lowest maximum sub-
merged speed (Utility of zero) required for successful performance
of Scenario =1 missions ; Scenario #2 missions























3. Given the trade-offs between size, power drain by internal
equipment, battery size limitations, etc., and assuming that the
submarine will have to transit to the operating area, localize and
attack the target without anything but the mo3t general targeting
data, what is the maximum submerged endurance desirable/technologi-
cally feasible (Utility of ten) for the mission outlined in Scenario
t1 ; Scenario #2 ? What is the lowest submerged
endurance (Utility of zero) required for successful performance of
the Scenario =1 mission ; the Scenario t2 mission ?
Please sketch the two curves in the spaces below.
Submersed Endurance
























k. liven the trade-off3 in platform 3ize, hit probability, platform
cost, and the desirability of launching multiple torpedoes in cer-
tain circumstances to increase the chances of multiple hits on the
target, what number of torpedo tubes would be optimal (Utility of
ten) for performance of the mission outlined in Scenario rf1 j
Scenario -?2 ? What is the minimum number of torpedo tubes
required for successful completion of the Scenario ^1 mission
the Scenario 77=2 mission ? Please sketch the two curves in






Number of Torpedo Tubes
Scenario #1
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5. Given platform size, amount of stowage space, etc., crade-offs,
what is the optimal number of torpedoes (Utility of ten) to carry
on-board a submarine performing the Scenario -fl mission
;
the Scenario =2 r.ission ? What is the lowest number of
torpedoes (Utility of zero) which can be carried and still 3uccess-
; the Scenario #2fully perform the Scenario #1 mission
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6. Given the trade-offs between penetration capability, range,
accuracy, etc., what toroedo speed is optimal (Utility of ten)
given the Scenario #1 mission ; the Scenario #2 mission
? What is the minimum torpedo speed required (Utility
of zero) for successful execution of the mission outlined in
Scenario #1 ; Scenario #2 ? Please sketch the
two curves in the spaces below.
Torpedo Speed
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7. Oiven accuracy and other trade-offs which enter into range con-
siderations, what is the maximum effective range of the torpedo
(Utility of ten) which is most desirable/technologically feasible
for the performance of the Scenario #1 mission ; the
Scenario y2 mission ? What is the minimum effective range
of the torpedo which would permit successful completion of the mis-
sion outlined in Scenario ?1 ; Scenario 42 ? Please
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8. What utility scores would you attach to the following toroedo
guidance systems given the requirements of the missions outlined In
the two scenarios? (Utility scores range from a high of ten to a





9. Assuming that the submarine will have to localize and attack
the target without anything more than the most general information
from outside sources to support the attack, what utility scores
would you attach to the following acquisition techniques in opera-
tions against merchant ship/tanker- si zed targets in Scenario #1 and
against combatant-sized targets in Scenario #2? (Utility scores
range from a high of ten to a low of zero.)









10. Given the fact that a submarine's ESM capability can be used
as a detection/localization and verification tool, what utility score
would you assign (Utility scores range from a maximum of ten to a
minimum of zero) to a submarine with an SSM capability in Scenario
#1 : in Senario ff2 ?
11. What utility score would you assign to a short range, sub-
merged-launch anti-ship missile ( SLAM) capability given the merchant
3hip/tanker target outlined in Scenario #1 ; given the
combatant target outlined in Scenario rt2 ?
12. With the wide variety of performance characteristics covered
in this questionnaire, it is probable that not all of the character-
istics contribute equally to mission success. In the spaces below
indicate the weighting factor which should be applied to each
characteristic based en that characteristic's contribution to suc-
cessful completion of the missions outlined in the two scenarios.
If you feel that two or more characteristics are equally important
to successful completion, they should be assigned the same weighting
factor. Weightings range from zero, which means that the factor
makes no contribution to successful mission completion, to ten, which
means that the characteristic plays an essential role in successful
completion of the mission outlined. Please weight only those factors
which you judged in the previous sections of the questionnaire.




d. Number of torpedo tubes
e. Number of torpedoes
f. Torpedo speed
g. Effective range of the torpedo








13. A lesser developed nation's capacity to provide qualified
crews and to maintain the weapons system is of concern... in attempting
to evaluate the military worth of the diesel submarines found in
their inventory. Please provide your evaluation of the relative
importance of the human factors and the platform's performance
characteristics for diesel submarines performing the missions out-
lined in the two scenarios. Scores range from a high of ten to a
low of zero. Ten indicates that the factor is all important to
mission success. A score of zero indicates that the factor has no
importance in performing the mission successfully. Duplicate
scores can be awarded if you feel the two factors have equal im-
portance .
Scenario #1 Scenario #2
Human factors—capability to rr.an,
maintain and operate the sub-
marine .
Performance :, actcr3--overall per-
formance capabilities of the
weapons system.
Any comments which you would like to include in the space
below would be greatly appreciated. Again, thank you very much fcr




ANTISHIP MISSILE COMBATANT QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS




Designated Maximum Platform Speed
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RANGE AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINED SPEED (SCENARIO #1)
10.0 T
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 NM
Range at Maximum Sustained Speed
RANGE AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINED SPEED (SCENARIO #2)
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#6 #7 #8 #9
Average
Score
Chaff Dispenser 5 7 10 2 2 2.9
Broad-band Jammer 5 3 10 6 10 4.9
Spot Jammer 3 5 7 4 2.7
Chaff plus Broad-band
Jammer 5 8 7 2.9
Chaff plus Spot Jammer 5 9 4 2.6
Broad-band and Spot
Jammer 5 6 10 7 4.0
Chaff, Broad-band and
Spot Jammers 5 10 7 7 4.1
ECM CAPABILITIES (SCENARIO #2)
Chaff Dispenser 10 2 7 6 10 10 9 6.0
Broad-band Jammer 10 4 2 2 10 4 2 4.9
Spot Jammer 8 9 1 6 7 3 4.9
Chaff plus Broad-band
Jammer 10 4 2 8 8 8 5.7
Chaff plus Spot Jammer 8 9 2 10 7 6 6.0
Broad-band and Spot
Jammer 10 10 2 6 10 5 3 6.6
Chaff, Broad-band and
Spot Jammers 10 10 2 9 7 10 10 3.3




AAA Gun and Point
Defense SAM




#3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9
Average
Score
1 2 6 7 4 8 8 1 4.1
5 6 2 10 10 5 10 10 6 7.1
7 7 112 7 6 4 4 4.7
AAA Gun and Gatling Gun
AAA Gun, Gatling Gun
and Point Defense SAM 5
3.9
9 10 2 1 10 8 10 5.6
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NUMBER OF MISSILE TUBES (SCENARIO #1)
10.0 n
Number of Missile Tubes
NUMBER OF MISSILE TUBES (SCENARIO #2)
10.0 n
k 8 12
Number of Missile Tubes
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Guidance 6 9 2 5 7 2 5.2
Beam Rider 1 4 1 3 2 2 1.6
Active Radar 5 9 5 10 5 2 2 8 5.8
Anti-Radiation Homing 8 1 3 7 10 6 6 6 5.9
Wire Guided 6 4 4 1.8
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HOME-ON -JAM CAPABILITY (SCENARIO #2)
Judges' Scores



















#2 #3 #^ #5 #6 #7 #8 #9
Average
Score
5 10 7 8 9 9 6 7.7
8 5 10 9 10 10 10 8.9
l* 6 5 10 5 5 4 5.6
FUZING CONFIGURATIONS (SCENARIO #2)
Contact Fuze 6 6 6
Contact with Delay 8 8
Proximity Fuze 10 10 10
9 9 9 5 7.1
10 5 5 8 6.3




TORPEDO-FIRING DIESEL SUBMARINE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

















































NUMBER OF TORPEDO TUBES (SCENARIO #1)
10.0
3 (5 T 1'2
Number of Torpedo Tubes
15 Tubes
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TORPEDO GUIDANCE SYSTEMS (SCENARIO #1)
Judges' Scores



















10 10 10 10 10
2 3
8 10















ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES (SCENARIO #1)
Judges' Scores












ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES (SCENARIO #2)
Visual 3 3 10 10
Active Sonar
Passive Sonar 8 10 10 10


























6 9 3 2* 9 4 5.8







#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
Score
10 8 5 3 1 4.5
8 10 5
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From: Curricular Officer, Naval Intelligence Curriculum (Code-39)
To:
Subj: Sea Denial Capabilities Questionnaire
End: (1) Questionnaire instructions.
(2) Country list #1 .
(3) Country list #2.
(k) Country list #3.
1. Enclosures I-I4. represent one part of a student research
project currently underway at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Results of this questionnaire will be incorporated into a thesis
being prepared by LT Lowell S. Jacoby a3 a degree requirement
in the Naval Intelligence Curriculum.





SEA DENIAL CAPABILITIES MEASUREMENT
Questionnaire Instructions
This questionnaire is part of a student research project
being conducted by LT Lowell E. Jacoby at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The research is attempting to evaluate the sea denial
capabilities of various nations. Countries selected for study
have or will receive anti-ship missile-equipped surface ships
and/or torpedo-firing diesel submarines.
Based on your expertise, you are asked to judge the various
nations' capabilities to successfully operate these weapons
platforms in an open ocean sea denial mission. Criteria for
this evaluation might include (but not necessarily be limited to):
a proven ability to perform this mission, the technology/training
needed to maintain these weapons systems, and the ability to man
these platforms with crews adequately trained to perform the
mission.
Specifically, you are asked to divide 100 points between
the two countries in each of the pairs contained in Enclosures
2, 3, and U. in such a way as to reflect their relative capabilities
to perform the open ocean sea denial mission with an anti-ship
missile-equipped surface combatant and/or a torpedo-firing diesel
submarine. For example, if two judges made the following point
divisions it would indicate that Judge #1 feels that Prance is
four times more capable than Albania, while Judge #2 feels that
the two countries possess equal sea denial capabilities.
Judge #1 Judge #2
Albania 20 Albania 50
France 80 France $0
Again, let me emphasize that the questionnaire seeks to
elicit a personal judgement based on your expertise.












































































































Saudi Arabia India Libya
Morocco Algeria Morocco
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